Statuts: | Enquête Officielle |
Date: | dimanche 21 février 1982 |
Heure: | 15:33 |
Type/Sous-type: |  de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter 100 |
Compagnie: | Pilgrim Airlines |
Immatriculation: | N127PM |
Numéro de série: | 105 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1968 |
Heures de vol: | 27015 |
Moteurs: | 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-27 |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 2 |
Passagers: | victimes: 1 / à bord: 10 |
Total: | victimes: 1 / à bord: 12 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | Scituate Reservoir, RI ( Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
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Phase de vol: | En vol (ENR) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
Aéroport de départ: | Groton-New London Airport, CT (GON/KGON), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Aéroport de destination: | Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS/KBOS), Etats-Unis d'Amérique |
Numéro de vol: | 458 |
Détails:At 4000 feet light icing on the windshield was noted, and the de-icing system was activated. After two cycles of de-icing, alcohol was smelled in the cockpit, and smoke was coming up from the control yoke. An emergency landing was attempted at Providence, RI but smoke and flames forced the crew to land on 10-12 inch thick ice on a reservoir. By then, heavy black smoke poured in the cockpit and fire was seen. Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed and the right wing was sheared off.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The deficient design of the isopropyl alcohol windshield washer/de-icer system and the inadequate maintenance of the system which resulted in an in-flight fire. The ignition source of the fire was not determined."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-82-7 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» NTSB-AAR-82-07
Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 13-JUL-1982 | To: FAA | A-82-56 |
ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE TO REQUIRE A REDESIGN AND MODIFICATION OF ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL WINDSHIELD DEICING SYSTEMS INSTALLED ON DHC-6 AIRCRAFT TO ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL FOR ALCOHOL LEAKAGE OR, IF PRACTICABLE, TO REQUIRE REPLACEMENT OF THESE SYSTEMS WITH THE ELECTRICALLY HEATED WINDSHIELDS OFFERED BY THE MANUFACTURER AS AN ALTERNATIVE INSTALLATION. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 13-JUL-1982 | To: FAA | A-82-57 |
REVIEW AND EVALUATE THE DESIGN OF ALL ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL WINDSHIELD DEICING SYSTEM INSTALLATIONS ON AIRCRAFT TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO FLAMMABLE FLUID FIRE PROTECTION, AND TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT ANY DEFICIENCIES FOUND. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 27-JUL-1982 | To: FAA | A-82-70 |
ISSUE AN OPERATIONS BULLETIN REQUIRING PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS INSPECTORS OF 14 CFR PART 135 OPERATORS TO DETERMINE (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 27-JUL-1982 | To: FAA | A-82-71 |
ISSUE A MAINTENANCE BULLETIN CALLING ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR PROPERLY FUNCTIONING PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS TO ASSURE THAT SAFETY MESSAGES BY THE CREW ARE UNDERSTANDABLE IN ALL PARTS OF THE CABIN BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN FLIGHT. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 27-JUL-1982 | To: FAA | A-82-72 |
AMEND 14 CFR 135.155 TO MAKE THE REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE ACCESSIBILITY AND LOCATION OF FIRE EXTINQUISHERS IN PASSENGER COMPARTMENTS OF AIRCRAFT IN COMMUTER SERVICE AT LEAST AS STRINGENT AS THE REQUIREMENTS IN 14 CFR 91.193 (C)(4). (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
Issued: 27-JUL-1982 | To: FAA | A-82-73 |
REVIEW THE TRAINING OF AND THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION INSPECTORS AND MODIFY THEM IF NECESSARY TO PROVIDE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE PROVISIONS OF 14 CFR PART 135 WITH REGARD TO OCCUPANT SAFETY AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Groton-New London Airport, CT et Boston-Logan International Airport, MA est de 143 km (89 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.