Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | mercredi 18 mai 2005 |
Heure: | 11:43 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Airbus A320-211 |
Opérant pour: | LTE International Airways |
Loué à : | Jordan Aviation |
Immatriculation: | JY-JAR |
Numéro de série: | 234 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1991-07-12 (13 years 10 months) |
Heures de vol: | 28957 |
Cycles: | 16321 |
Moteurs: | 2 CFMI CFM56-5A3 |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 7 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 171 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / à bord: 178 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Mineurs |
Conséquences: | Repaired |
Lieu de l'accident: | Leeds/Bradford Airport (LBA) ( Royaume Uni)
|
Phase de vol: | A l'atterrissage (LDG) |
Nature: | Charter International |
Aéroport de départ: | Puerto del Rosario Airport, Canary Islands/Fuerteventura Island (FUE/GCFV), Espagne |
Aéroport de destination: | Leeds/Bradford Airport (LBA/EGNM), Royaume Uni |
Détails:While landing on runway 14 at Leeds Bradford Airport the aircraft touched down just beyond the end of the marked touchdown zone with low autobrake selected. Manual wheel braking commenced shortly after mainwheel touchdown. At a groundspeed of around 70 kt the brakes ceased operating, for about 17 seconds. A pronounced dip in the runway surface initially prevented the pilots from seeing the runway end. When it became apparent to the commander that it would not be possible to stop before the end of the
runway, he deliberately did not select alternate braking, as this would have caused loss of nosewheel steering, but instead used nosewheel steering to turn the aircraft sharply to the right. The aircraft skidded sideways and came to a halt with its nosewheels off the runway, shortly before the end of the paved surface and the start of a steep down slope.
Probable Cause:
Causal factors:
1. Excessive wheel tachometer signal noise, caused by a bent tachometer driveshaft on each main landing gear assembly, resulted in loss of braking using the Normal system.
2. Inadequate fault tolerance within the brake control system led to the sustained loss of Normal braking during the landing ground roll.
3. There was no flight deck indication of brake system malfunction, and this delayed the crews recognition of the loss of braking.
4. There was a lack of effective action to fully rectify brake system anomalies apparent from previous incidents and accidents.
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | AAIB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 7 months | Accident number: | AAR 6/2007 | Download report: | Final report
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Sources:
» AAIB Formal: AAR 6/2007
Opérations de secours
AAIB issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: Jordan CAA | 2007-012 |
The Jordanian Civil Aviation Authority should ensure that aircraft operators under their jurisdiction have procedures in place to ensure the continued airworthiness of mandatory flight recorders. (Accepted - Closed) |
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: CAA | 2007-013 |
The Civil Aviation Authority should publish information within the Aeronautical Information Package relating to runways which do not comply with the provisions of CAP 168, or which have profiles that reduce the ability of pilots to assess landing performance distance remaining visually, in the form of a Warning. within the Local Traffic Regulations section or the Remarks area of Runway Physical Characteristics for all affected UK airports. |
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: ICAO | 2007-014 |
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should re-assess the benefits and disadvantages to runway situational awareness of runway distance markers for any runway which has a profile that prevents the end of the paved surface from being in view continuously from the flight deck. If the re-assessment concludes that a net benefit is likely, the ICAO should encourage the installation of such markers at relevant civil airports. |
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: EASA | 2007-015 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency should require the expeditious replacement of the long hollow titanium tachometer driveshaft in the braking systems of the A320 family of aircraft with a driveshaft of improved design. (Rejected - open) |
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: EASA | 2007-016 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency should ensure the replacement of software Standards 7 or 9 with Standard 9.1 or a proven later version, in those remaining Airbus A319 and A320 brake and steering control units not yet so modified. (Accepted - Closed) |
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: EASA | 2007-018 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency should consider requiring, for aircraft in the A320 family and other aircraft with similar combined Brakes and Steering Control systems, changes that allow manual selection of Alternate braking without consequent loss of nosewheel steering. |
Issued: 11-DEC-2007 | To: EASA | 2007-019 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency should require Airbus to take measures aimed at ensuring that anomalies in A318/319/320/321 aircraft braking systems that may lead to loss of Normal braking are clearly indicated to the flight crew. |
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Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Puerto del Rosario Airport, Canary Islands/Fuerteventura Island et Leeds/Bradford Airport est de 2976 km (1860 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.