Narrative:
A Bombardier Challenger 300 corporate jet sustained damage in a runway excursion accident at Iqaluit Airport, NU (YFB), Canada. There were no injuries, and aircraft damage was limited to the nose and main landing gear, which was subsequently replaced.
The flight departed Long Beach, CA (LGB) en route to Milan, Italy, with a planned fuel stop in Iqaluit (YFB), Canada. The flight time to Iqaluit was 5 hours and 36 minutes at a cruise altitude of 41 000 feet. The flight en route was uneventful; the outside temperature at the cruising altitude was approximately -60°C.
The first officer was the pilot flying. An ILS/DME approach to runway 35 at Iqaluit was carried out with the autopilot on. The reported surface winds were within the aircraft limitations for a right crosswind with a light tailwind component. A reference speed (VREF) of 114 knots was calculated. The before-landing checklist items were completed 3 miles prior to the final approach fix. The autopilot was disconnected, and the aircraft crossed the threshold at a speed of about 118 knots.
The aircraft touched down approximately 10 feet to the right of the centreline at 21:00. Once the nose wheel contacted the runway, the aircraft veered to the right. The crew applied full left rudder and left brake while selecting left nose steering with the tiller. Thrust reversers were also selected, but the aircraft continued to pull to the right. The aircraft departed the runway 4300 feet from the threshold and came to rest in packed snow 100 feet from the runway edge lights. The nose landing gear (NLG) came to rest in snow reaching the top of the wheel height, and the main landing gear (MLG) came to rest in snow reaching half the wheel height.
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. On touchdown, the nose wheel veered to the right, and the crews attempt to control the uncommanded veer was not successful.
2. The electro hydraulic servo valve did not respond to steering commands, and the steering control unit logic commanded the steering selector valve to close. The steering selector valve did not close, and this condition prevented the nose-wheel steering system from free castering with the steering pointing to the right.
3. The electro hydraulic servo valve likely failed due to contamination, internal corrosion and exposure to cold temperatures.
Findings as to risk:
1. If aircraft components have a lengthy time limit of operation without an accompanying periodic maintenance schedule, and component service history is not regularly reviewed, there is an increased risk of an unexpected component failure.
2. If cockpit voice recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | Saturday 12 March 2011 |
| Time: | 21:00 |
| Type: |  Bombardier BD-100-1A10 Challenger 300 |
| Operator: | Tri Marine Management Company LLC |
| Registration: | N818RC |
| MSN: | 20165 |
| First flight: | 2004 |
| Engines: | 2 Honeywell AS907-1-1A |
| Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1 |
| Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3 |
| Aircraft damage: | Unknown |
| Aircraft fate: | Repaired |
| Location: | Iqaluit Airport, NU (YFB) ( Canada)
|
| Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Long Beach Municipal Airport, CA (LGB/KLGB), United States of America |
| Iqaluit Airport, NU (YFB/CYFB), Canada |
A Bombardier Challenger 300 corporate jet sustained damage in a runway excursion accident at Iqaluit Airport, NU (YFB), Canada. There were no injuries, and aircraft damage was limited to the nose and main landing gear, which was subsequently replaced.
The flight departed Long Beach, CA (LGB) en route to Milan, Italy, with a planned fuel stop in Iqaluit (YFB), Canada. The flight time to Iqaluit was 5 hours and 36 minutes at a cruise altitude of 41 000 feet. The flight en route was uneventful; the outside temperature at the cruising altitude was approximately -60°C.
The first officer was the pilot flying. An ILS/DME approach to runway 35 at Iqaluit was carried out with the autopilot on. The reported surface winds were within the aircraft limitations for a right crosswind with a light tailwind component. A reference speed (VREF) of 114 knots was calculated. The before-landing checklist items were completed 3 miles prior to the final approach fix. The autopilot was disconnected, and the aircraft crossed the threshold at a speed of about 118 knots.
The aircraft touched down approximately 10 feet to the right of the centreline at 21:00. Once the nose wheel contacted the runway, the aircraft veered to the right. The crew applied full left rudder and left brake while selecting left nose steering with the tiller. Thrust reversers were also selected, but the aircraft continued to pull to the right. The aircraft departed the runway 4300 feet from the threshold and came to rest in packed snow 100 feet from the runway edge lights. The nose landing gear (NLG) came to rest in snow reaching the top of the wheel height, and the main landing gear (MLG) came to rest in snow reaching half the wheel height.
Probable Cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. On touchdown, the nose wheel veered to the right, and the crews attempt to control the uncommanded veer was not successful.
2. The electro hydraulic servo valve did not respond to steering commands, and the steering control unit logic commanded the steering selector valve to close. The steering selector valve did not close, and this condition prevented the nose-wheel steering system from free castering with the steering pointing to the right.
3. The electro hydraulic servo valve likely failed due to contamination, internal corrosion and exposure to cold temperatures.
Findings as to risk:
1. If aircraft components have a lengthy time limit of operation without an accompanying periodic maintenance schedule, and component service history is not regularly reviewed, there is an increased risk of an unexpected component failure.
2. If cockpit voice recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
Accident investigation:
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Classification:
Runway excursion (veer-off)
Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Long Beach Municipal Airport, CA to Iqaluit Airport, NU as the crow flies is 4695 km (2934 miles).
Distance from Long Beach Municipal Airport, CA to Iqaluit Airport, NU as the crow flies is 4695 km (2934 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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