ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 319662
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| Date: | Wednesday 2 May 2018 |
| Time: | 12:15 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-8K5 (WL) |
| Owner/operator: | TUI fly Belgium |
| Registration: | OO-JAY |
| MSN: | 40944 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2013 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-7B27E |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 188 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial, repaired |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Marrakech-Menara Airport (RAK) -
 Morocco
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Brest-Guipavas Airport (BES/LFRB) |
| Marrakech-Menara Airport (RAK/GMMX) | |
| Investigating agency: | BEA Maroc |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
TUI fly Belgium flight TB3640, was a service from Brest Airport in France to Marrakech Airport in Morocco. The first officer, who was line flying under supervision, was Pilot Flying while the captain, who had a Flight Instructor Rating, was Pilot Monitoring on the flight.
The flight was uneventful, the weather conditions were favourable, and the crew requested a visual approach for a landing on runway 10 at Marrakech, which was received at 5NM from the ODALO point, allowing the crew to have a long final approach of about 20NM before landing. The ILS frequency was selected for both pilots, while the FD was switched off when the clearance was received for a visual approach.
At 200ft agl the aircraft was below glide path, the first officer corrected by increasing thrust without controlling the vertical path being, causing the aircraft to be high on the glide path. The trainee first officer then reduced thrust (almost to idle) to catch up with the glide path by descending to the runway at 100 feet above ground level, with a very high descent rate.
It was at this point that the instructor pilot had to make a decision to either take control to correct the course, or abort the landing and do a go-around as the approach was no longer stabilised and the first officer's corrections were excessive.
As the first officer had 500 hours on the type, the captain decided not to take control. Thrust was increased to decrease the rate of descent. The aircraft then made a hard landing with bounce. When the wheels touched the ground during the landing, the captain finally decided to take control. He also decided to reduce thrust further, to avoid a long landing after the bounce.
As the aircraft was at a higher height than the recommended flare height, this manoeuvre was poorly executed with a nose-up attitude exceeding the values required for a safe landing.
Despite the pilot's action on the control column to remedy the situation, this did not prevent the aft fuselage from contacting the runway.
Probable causes of the accident:
- Inappropriate execution of the landing procedure by the flight crew;
- Inappropriate correction by the first officer to catch up with the landing path;
- Delayed reaction by the captain to rectify the situation;
- Inadequate response by the first officer to the landing procedure;
- Late reaction by captain to remedy this situation;
- Inadequate decision by the captain to continue the landing.
Contributing factors:
- Lack of experience in the first officer;
- Unfamiliar terrain for the first officer;
- Lack of experience of the Type Rating Instructor pilot.
METAR:
12:00 UTC / local time:
GMMX 021200Z 36004KT 310V090 9999 FEW020 18/06 Q1017 NOSIG=
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
Location
Revision history:
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