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Status: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:Tuesday 28 April 2020
Time:13:44
Type:Silhouette image of generic BE10 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Beechcraft A100 King Air
Operator:Buffalo Airways
Registration: C-FCBZ
MSN: B-116
First flight: 1972
Total airframe hrs:13028
Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-28
Crew:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Passengers:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0
Total:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Location:Kugaaruk Airport, NU (YBB) (   Canada)
Phase: Landing (LDG)
Nature:Domestic Non Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:Cambridge Bay Airport, NU (YCB/CYCB), Canada
Destination airport:Kugaaruk Airport, NU (YBB/CYBB), Canada
Flightnumber:BFL666
Narrative:
A Buffalo Airways Beech King Air suffered a runway excursion on landing at Kugaaruk Airport, Canada.
At 12:16, the aircraft departed Cambridge Bay Airport for Kugaaruk (CYBB). The first officer was the pilot flying. At 13:19, when the flight was about 80 nautical miles from CYBB at flight level 210, the flight crew called the CYBB community aerodrome radio station. The flight crew received the runway surface condition report and were informed that the winds were from 200° true, at 24 knots gusting to 33 knots. At 13:20, the community aerodrome radio station operator called the flight crew and relayed the CYBB 1300 weather observation, reporting that the horizontal visibility was 1/4 statute mile in light snow and blowing snow and that the vertical visibility was 400 feet. The flight crew noted that the visibility had decreased since their departure from Cambridge Bay but continued the approach. The reported wind would result in a 12-to 16-knot crosswind component from the left on runway 23. The captain took control at 13:27, at the start of the descent, and descent checks were carried out.
The captain transferred control back to the first officer at the initial approach waypoint, DATLA, and briefed for a pilot-monitored area navigation (RNAV) approach to runway 23. From the intermediate approach waypoint to the missed approach waypoint the approach is flown on a track of 244°T, which is offset 15° from the runway heading of 229°T. When the runway is acquired visually at or before the minimum descent altitude (MDA), a left turn is required to align the aircraft with the runway heading.
During the descent the flight crew activated the runway lights and the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system via the aircraft radio control of airport lighting system (ARCAL). The captain set the flaps to the approach setting (40%), and the first officer flew the descent. When the captain then confirmed visual contact with the runway, snow was blowing across it at an angle from left to right. The runway itself was apparent as a black shape within the blowing snow; however, the runway lighting and PAPI were not observed. The captain set the flaps to the land setting (100%) and then, as part of the pilot-monitored approach procedure, assumed control of the aircraft as the pilot flying. The first officer looked up from the instruments and observed, through the blowing snow, the runway as well as the community aerodrome radio station and airport apron ahead and off to the left.
The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 100 knots indicated airspeed. As the captain flared the aircraft, the first officer warned the captain of snowbanks off to the right side of the runway.
At 13:50, when the right main landing gear touched down, the aircraft veered to the right and departed the runway surface. The right wing contacted snowbanks and the aircraft turned approximately 90° to the right before colliding nose first with a high snowbank. Both crew members, who were not injured, exited through the cabin door.
The aircraft was substantially damaged; however, the freight remained secure. The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) did not activate and there was no fire.

Probable Cause:

Findings as to causes and contributing factors
1. Approaches to airports north of 60°N latitude are not restricted by ground visibility and, as a result, the flight crew continued the approach when the reported visibility was ¼ statute mile, which is lower than the published advisory visibility of 1¾ statute miles for this approach.
2. The flight crew believed that the lack of an approach ban permitted a landing, and landed at Kugaaruk Airport even though the reported ground visibility was below the minimum aerodrome operating visibility.
3. The offset approach, the crosswind component from the left, and the moving-runway illusion created by the blowing snow, all contributed to the aircraft’s alignment with the right side of the runway.
4. The aircraft touched down near the right edge of the runway and, when the right landing gear impacted the deeper snow along the runway edge, the aircraft veered to the right and departed the runway surface.
5. The snow depth adjacent to the runway was allowed to exceed the limits dictated by the airport operator’s Winter Maintenance Plan. Consequently, the aircraft sustained additional damage when it departed the runway surface.

Accident investigation:
cover
Investigating agency: TSB Canada
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year
Accident number: A20C0037
Download report: Final report
Language: English

Classification:
Runway excursion (veer-off)

Sources:
» CBC
» TSB A20C0037


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Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Cambridge Bay Airport, NU to Kugaaruk Airport, NU as the crow flies is 613 km (383 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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GAPPRE
GAPPRE
Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (GAPPRE): recommendations and guidance material to prevent runway excursions

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