ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 155847
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.
| Date: | Wednesday 7 April 2010 |
| Time: | 13:30 |
| Type: |  Piper PA-28-161 |
| Owner/operator: | Tromsø Flyklubb |
| Registration: | LN-TOS |
| MSN: | 2842248 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2005 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Kåfjorddalen, Troms -
 Norway
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Tromsø/Langnes Airport (TOS/ENTC) |
| Tromsø/Langnes Airport (TOS/ENTC) | |
| Investigating agency: | AIBN |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The commander flew a passenger over her childhood home in Kåfjorddalen in Troms County, Norway. During climb-out, after the second pass, the airplane hit a cable car wire approximately 416 ft above the ground. Parts of the tail and the right wing were torn off and the airplane was close to becoming uncontrollable. However, the commander regained control and landed later at Tromsø Airport Langnes (ENTC) without further damage. The commander exposed himself to great risk by flying low in a narrow valley. The cable car was not easy to detect on the map that was used by the commander, and it was hard to spot the wire from the air. The cable car was equipped with an Obstacle Collision Avoidance System (OCAS) warning system, but neither the flashlight nor the aural warning via the VHF-radio was detected by the pilot. The investigation has revealed that the warning lights were ineffective. Furthermore, the system has a fundamental weakness because the aural warning is only allowed to be transmitted at 6 frequencies. These frequencies does not necessarily correlate with the frequencies used for radio communication in the area, and have to be intentionally set manually for the warning to be received. The consequence may be that the aural warning, as in this case, is not detected as a last defense for those who need it the most. The AIBN believes that the Norwegian CAA has not given these issues sufficient focus during the system’s operational approval. Moreover the AIBN revealed weaknesses in how information about OCAS is communicated to key user groups.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.aibn.no/Luftfart/Rapporter/2013-14
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 09-May-2013 18:25 | harro | Added |
| 13-Jan-2022 09:30 | harro | Updated [Cn, Accident report] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation