ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 192051
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Date: | Sunday 31 March 2013 |
Time: | |
Type: | Fokker 100 |
Owner/operator: | Austrian Airlines |
Registration: | OE-LVL |
MSN: | 11404 |
Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
Aircraft damage: | None |
Category: | Serious incident |
Location: | Genève-Cointrin Airport (GVA/LSGG) -
Switzerland
|
Phase: | Take off |
Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
Departure airport: | Genève-Cointrin Airport (GVA/LSGG) |
Destination airport: | Wien-Schwechat Airport (VIE/LOWW) |
Investigating agency: | STSB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:A Boeing 737-800 (TC-JGV) operating flight TK1919 from Istanbul, Turkey, was making a visual approach on runway 05 at Genève-Cointrin Airport in good weather conditions. When it was on final 7.5 NM from the runway threshold, the aerodrome controller was lining up and holding a Fokker 100 (OE-LVL) which was operating flight OS582 to Vienna, Austria. To expedite the flow of traffic, he previously cleared a PC-12 for take-off from intersection taxiway Z, but waited until the latter was a sufficient distance away before clearing OS582 for take-off. The controller realised that his tactic would cause a dangerous convergence between TK1919 and OS582. The activation of the RIMCAS runway safety net a few seconds later confirmed and attested to this concern. Confronted by the alert, he judged that clearing TK1919 to land involved less risk that ordering a simultaneous go-around and aborted take-off. When TK1919 was crossing the runway 05 threshold, it was 1206 m from OS582 which was lifting off, whereas the prescribed reduced runway separation minima is 2400 m.
Causes:
The serious incident is attributable to the dangerous convergence of an aircraft on take-off and an aircraft in landing phase, on concrete runway 05 because of the inappropriate integration of a take-off from intersection taxiway Z.
The investigation identified the following factor playing a systemic role in the serious incident:
- the parameterisation of the RIMCAS system (Runway Incursion Monitoring and Conflict Alert Sub-System).
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | STSB |
Report number: | |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
18-Dec-2016 20:22 |
harro |
Added |
24-Oct-2018 16:01 |
harro |
Updated [Source, Accident report, ] |
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