ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 206212
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Date: | Thursday 8 February 2018 |
Time: | 08:25 UTC |
Type: | Boeing 737-8K2 (WL) |
Owner/operator: | Transavia France |
Registration: | F-GZHO |
MSN: | 43880/5270 |
Year of manufacture: | 2015 |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 180 |
Aircraft damage: | None |
Category: | Incident |
Location: | Paris-Orly Airport (ORY/LFPO) -
France
|
Phase: | Take off |
Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
Departure airport: | Paris-Orly Airport (ORY/LFPO) |
Destination airport: | Marrakech-Menara Airport (RAK/GMMX) |
Investigating agency: | BEA |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:Transavia France flight TO3010 returned to land at Paris-Orly Airport, France. During the taxi to runway 25 the "AUTOSLAT FAIL" alert was displayed. Then, during the take-off run, the "IAS Disagree" message appeared at 90 kts. The crew continued the take-off. During the initial climb, the messages "AOA DISAGREE" and "ALT DISAGREE" were displayed. The crew turned around and landed without problems. On the ground, it was found that an AOA probe had failed.
The previous evening, the aircraft had encountered an identical issue during takeoff on a maintenance ferry flight from Norwich, United Kingdom, to Paris-Orly.
Contributing factors
The following factors contributed to the dysfunction of the right AOA sensor and the display of the IAS DISAGREE, AOA DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE alerts during the take-off of the flights of 7 and 8 February.
- The contamination of resolver 2 of the right AOA sensor by a solvent which led to a failure of the resolver and erroneous speed and altitude indications, followed by the AOA, IAS and ALT DISAGREE alerts. The investigation was not able to determine the cause of this contamination which seems to be an isolated case nor the reason why this defect, present since the installation of the sensor on the aeroplane, led to the activation of the alerts during a post maintenance flight. However, it is possible that the handling of the sensor during maintenance exacerbated the dysfunction without the technicians realising this.
- The technician working on the aeroplane between the two flights not using the FIM. Its use would have ensured that a more complete check was carried out, the failure would have probably been detected and the sensor replaced.
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | BEA |
Report number: | |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 9 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
https://www.bea.aero/index.php?id=40&news=18341&cHash=5724da2ef0d6411e59895fe20d5969bd https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/f-gzho#105ca69c https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=244935 http://aerossurance.com/safety-management/aoa-anomalies-transavia-b738/
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft Media:
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
15-Feb-2018 21:02 |
harro |
Added |
16-Nov-2020 18:34 |
harro |
Updated [Time, Total occupants, Location, Phase, Source, Narrative, Accident report] |
24-Nov-2020 06:24 |
Aerossurance |
Updated [Source, Embed code, Accident report] |
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