ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 210396
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| Date: | Friday 11 April 1997 |
| Time: | 16:00 |
| Type: |  Aerospatiale AS 332L Super Puma |
| Owner/operator: | |
| Registration: | VH-BHT |
| MSN: | 2042 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Location: | Karratha Airport (YPKA), Karratha, WA -
 Australia
|
| Phase: | Taxi |
| Nature: | Offshore |
| Departure airport: | Griffen Venture, WA |
| YPKA | |
| Investigating agency: | BASI |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The helicopter was ferrying oil company personnel from the Griffen Venture oil rig to Karratha aerodrome. The weather was clear and the wind light. The co-pilot, occupying the left-pilot seat, was undergoing a line check by the pilot in command who was a company managing-captain and a qualified line-check captain. Although both pilots were experienced captains on the helicopter type, the co-pilot had the greater overall helicopter time, and the pilot in command the greater time on the helicopter type. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) evidence indicated that there was some discussion between the pilots about a particular company matter during the flight and ground-taxi. During the arrival at Karratha the co-pilot flew the approach, landing at a point known as "Heli 26" which is on taxiway F, parallel to runway 26. The pilot in command assumed control of the helicopter for the ground-taxi as control of the wheel brakes was possible only from the right-pilot seat. The co-pilot retracted the nose wheel-lock pin to allow the nose wheel to castor during taxi. CVR evidence indicated that the pilot in command did not invoke sterile-cockpit procedures and that the checklist challenge-and-response procedures were not conducted after the helicopter had landed. Both pilots reported however, that the pilot in command had completed the after-landing checks. The pilot in command taxied the helicopter along taxiway F, completing a 90-degree right turn into taxiway A and a left turn onto the terminal tarmac area. A company-LAME eyewitness reported that the nose wheel appeared to be castoring normally. The pilot in command reported that he applied the park brake before disembarking the passengers and that he released the park brake before taxiing the helicopter to the company lines. The challenge-and-response procedure required for the pre-taxi checklist was not conducted before taxiing from the disembarkation point. The helicopter had to be taxied slightly left around a parked BAe146 aircraft before executing a left 90-degree turn. This turn was succeeded by a right 90-degree turn to follow the marked taxiway, past a helicopter parking area. Having turned approximately 10 degrees left then 10 degrees right to go around the BAe146, the pilot in command attempted to turn the helicopter left to follow the marked taxiway. The helicopter's nose wheel steering did not fully respond. Although the pilot in command quickly realised that the nose wheel lock-pin had re-engaged and that he was unable to follow the marked taxiway, he decided to continue taxiing his helicopter through the occupied helicopter parking area. An eyewitness reported that the nose wheel was not castoring and that it was being dragged sideways on the tarmac as the helicopter turned slightly. Tyre-scuff marks on the tarmac surface confirmed that the nose wheel was not castoring. The co-pilot reported that when the helicopter would not turn, he checked the handle, finding it slightly proud of the full-down position. He attempted to withdraw the lock-pin by pushing down on the nose wheel castor-lock control handle, first with one hand, then with both hands. He also reported that as his attention was diverted to disengaging the nose wheel lock-pin, he did not initially realise that the helicopter was entering the helicopter parking area. The pilot in command stated that he did not attempt to bring the helicopter to a light-on-wheels condition or low-hover to unload the nose wheel to release the lock-pin, due to the proximity of parked helicopters. He also reported that he did not stop as he thought that the Super Puma would clear a nearby parked S76. The CVR recorded a comment by the co-pilot, 13 seconds after it was noticed that the pin was still engaged, which appeared to indicate that he also thought the Super Puma would clear the parked S76. A further four seconds later, the CVR recorded clipping sounds made by the main rotor contacting the S76 tail rotor blade. Both pilots heard the clipping sound which the pilot in command thought was a blade strike, although the co-pilot was unsure. The helicopter had travelled approximately 35 metres from where the lack of nose wheel castor was first noticed, to the impact point. Tips of two blades of the main rotor clipped a tail rotor blade of the nearby S76 helicopter. The tail rotor blade sheared at the contact point. The pilot in command then continued to taxi the helicopter across the parking area to the taxiway. Once clear of the parking area, he brought the helicopter to a light-on-wheels condition to unload the nose wheel. The co-pilot was then able to retract the nose wheel lock-pin which then allowed the helicopter to ground taxi normally.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1997/aair/199701170/
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/4930784/199701170.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 04-May-2018 12:39 | Pineapple | Added |
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