ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 211048
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| Date: | Sunday 13 May 2018 |
| Time: | 12:30 |
| Type: |  Cessna 182G Skylane |
| Owner/operator: | Private |
| Registration: | N2377R |
| MSN: | 18255477 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1964 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 4878 hours |
| Engine model: | Continental O-470 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Valley County, south of Smiths Ferry, ID -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Boise, ID (BOI) |
| MC CALL, ID (MYL) | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The private pilot had planned to fly his airplane to his newly purchased hangar at the destination airport. On the morning of the accident, the pilot monitored weather conditions along his proposed route of flight through internet applications and highway traffic cameras. The pilot told a friend that the ceilings at the destination airport were about 700 ft and rising and that the traffic cameras showed marginal weather conditions. The pilot also told his friend that he would wait to depart until early to mid-afternoon as long as the weather conditions improved. The investigation could not determine, with the available evidence, whether the pilot was aware of the published AIRMETs for mountain obscuration and icing along his route of flight during the time surrounding the accident.
When the pilot departed, the weather at the destination airport was consistent with visual meteorological conditions. However, another pilot flying a similar route as the accident pilot (but in the opposite direction) experienced low ceilings near the accident site shortly before the accident, so that pilot reversed course and landed safely. Radar data associated with the accident airplane and the debris path signatures indicated that the accident pilot likely encountered similar weather conditions and started to reverse course when the airplane impacted tree tops and then the ground. The orientation and length of the wreckage path were consistent with controlled flight into terrain. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures.
The pilot did not hold an instrument rating. He may have been aware of the AIRMETs for mountain obscuration and icing along his route of flight as he had been monitoring highway traffic cameras for any improvement in the weather conditions. Nevertheless, his poor decision to attempt the flight was likely influenced by his long-anticipated desire to finish moving into his new hangar at his destination airport. The pilot's route of flight was along a highway about 4,800 ft mean sea level located in a valley bordered by 5,500 foot tall mountains to his left and 6,500 foot tall mountains on his right and an overcast cloud layer at 1,100 ft above ground level. Radar data showed an airplane in a turn from a northern heading to a southern heading was likely from the accident airplane as it terminated near the accident site. This evidence and the impact signatures suggests the pilot probably encountered ground fog or an area of low visibility, but impacted a tree and terrain while attempting to turn around.
After the accident airplane departed, the pilot was handed off to a developmental (trainee) departure controller who provided radar services for the airplane in class C airspace, even though the airplane did not have a functioning transponder, which was inconsistent with the air traffic control (ATC) facility's standard operating procedures. Further, the developmental departure controller did not inform the controller relieving him, during the position relief briefing, of the accident airplane, which was also inconsistent with standard operating procedures. As a result, the oncoming departure controller was unable to track the accident airplane's position (because there were no alphanumeric data associated with the radar target) or terminate radar services when the airplane left the class C airspace (because he was unaware of the flight). Additionally, although the developmental departure controller did not generate a flight progress strip or use a memory aid to track the accident airplane, the facility's standard operating procedures did not require the use of flight progress strips for departing visual flight rules airplanes. However, the use of a flight progress strip might have aided the departure controller's situational awareness of the airplane. Because the accident was not survivable, the delay in identifying that the airplane had crashed did not impact the survivability of the accident.
Although some of the ATC service
Probable Cause: The non-instrument-rated pilot's improper decision to initiate a visual flight rules flight into an area with low ceilings due to mountain obscuration, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
NTSB
FAA register: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=2377R
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 15-May-2018 01:25 | Geno | Added |
| 15-May-2018 13:58 | Anon. | Updated [Damage] |
| 16-May-2018 05:36 | PCBGene | Updated [Total occupants] |
| 21-May-2018 10:16 | harro | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport] |
| 22-May-2020 09:24 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Operator, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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