ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 226133
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.
| Date: | Tuesday 11 December 2018 |
| Time: | 06:55 |
| Type: |  Embraer ERJ-190SR (ERJ-190-100 SR) |
| Owner/operator: | BA CityFlyer |
| Registration: | G-LCYZ |
| MSN: | 19000404 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2010 |
| Engine model: | General Electric CF34-10E5A1 G07 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 90 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | London City Airport (LCY/EGLC) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London City Airport (LCY/EGLC) |
| Milano-Linate Airport (LIN/LIML) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
It was the first flight of the day for the crew and they reported being well-rested. The co-pilot was nominated as Pilot Flying (PF) for the sector (flight BA7301 from London City to Milan). During cockpit preparation both pilots independently calculated takeoff performance figures for the aircraft using their electronic flight bags (EFBs). Having agreed the takeoff settings with PF, PM entered them into the flight management computer. The required engine thrust setting, as determined by the Airline’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), was T/O-1.
The crew reported that engine start and taxi to the runway were carried out without undue haste. Checklists were followed and the SOP Vital Data Review (VDR) was carried out. Neither pilot could remember if, during the VDR, the displayed T/O-3 setting had been read out incorrectly or whether the call had been misheard as ‘T/O-1’.
As the aircraft accelerated through 60 kt on the takeoff roll the commander realised that T/O-3 was displayed on EICAS. Concerned that the incorrect thrust setting invalidated their rejected takeoff stopping distance calculations, the commander deemed that continuing the takeoff was the safest option. As PM, they called V1 at the calculated speed but delayed the Vr call by approximately 5 kt to compensate for the reduced thrust level. PF did not experience any aircraft handling difficulties during the climb-out and the departure was conducted without further incident.
To better understand the safety impact of the incorrect takeoff setting, once above FL100 the crew recalculated their takeoff performance based on T/O-3 thrust. The calculations indicated that, while they would have been able to stop safely up to V1 , climb performance
might have been compromised had an engine failed shortly thereafter.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5ce3dc5740f0b627de486629/ERJ_190-100_SR_Embraer_190_G-LCYZ_06-19.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 13-Jun-2019 19:01 | harro | Added |
| 09-Oct-2022 18:38 | harro | Updated [Location] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation