ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 231894
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| Date: | Friday 20 December 2019 |
| Time: | 10:16 LT |
| Type: |  Airbus A318-111 |
| Owner/operator: | Air France |
| Registration: | F-GUGD |
| MSN: | 2081 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2003 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-5B8/P |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 119 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | near Toulon-Hyères Airport, Var 83 -
 France
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Paris-Orly Airport (ORY/LFPO) |
| Hyères Naval Air Station (TLN/LFTH) | |
| Investigating agency: | BEA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Air France flight AF7512 was on final approach to runway 05 when it captured a false secondary glide slope on the ILS. The pitch attitude increased and the angle of attack protection was activated. The aircraft, an Airbus A318, went around and landed safely after the second approach.
Contributing factors
The following factors may have contributed to a false glide slope signal being captured, followed by the AutoPilot (AP) increasing the pitch attitude and the activation of the flight envelope protections:
- The underestimation of the threat that a strong tailwind represents during the approach, mentioned for the landing phase during the approach briefing and insufficiently taken into account thereafter. Several factors may explain this underestimation:
* The presence of other threats possibly perceived as more serious, such as windshear, might have overshadowed this threat.
* The risk linked to a tailwind is often taken into account for landing and less so for the approach.
* In the flight file, the reported wind for the approach was a tailwind of 25 kt. The threat was therefore not easily identifiable during flight preparation.
- Insufficient monitoring of the glide path by the PM and the PF during the approach.
- Not taking into account the controller’s suggestion to fly a missed approach.
- The crew not having an objective in terms of altitude and distance to the threshold and not carrying out the checks at the key points of the approach, in particular on passing the Final Approach Point (FAP).
- The two pilots having had little exposure, in training and line flying, to the interception of the glide slope from above despite their aviation experience.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/event/incident-de-lairbus-a318-immatricule-f-gucd-exploite-par-air-france-survenu-le-20122019-a-orly-9/
Images:
Graphic: BEA
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 03-Jan-2020 09:35 | harro | Added |
| 18-Oct-2021 07:20 | harro | Updated [Total occupants, Narrative, Accident report] |
| 18-Oct-2021 07:24 | harro | Updated [Photo] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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