ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 232056
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Date: | Tuesday 31 March 1992 |
Time: | 11:30 UTC |
Type: | British Aerospace BAe-146-300 |
Owner/operator: | Air UK |
Registration: | G-UKHP |
MSN: | E3123 |
Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 81 |
Aircraft damage: | None |
Category: | Incident |
Location: | Aberdeen Airport -
United Kingdom
|
Phase: | Landing |
Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
Departure airport: | Edinburgh Airport |
Destination airport: | Aberdeen Airport |
Investigating agency: | AAIB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:The incident occurred when the aircraft, which was on a scheduled passenger flight from Edinburgh to Aberdeen, overran runway 34 whilst landing in heavy rain and strong crosswind conditions. The lift spoilers were not deployed and the aircraft brakes produced insufficient retardation to stop the aircraft on the wet runway surface. The passengers, who disembarked some time after the event, sustained no injuries. The aircraft suffered mud contamination of its wheels, brakes and engines.
The investigation identified the following causal factors:
(i) The commander omitted to select lift spoilers as a result of his pre-occupation in controlling the aircraft's attitude following the initial touchdown in strong crosswind conditions.
(ii) The consequences of lift spoiler non-deployment after touchdown were that the aerodynamic drag was not increased, and wing lift was not shed to transfer the aircraft's weight to the mainwheels, resulting in markedly reduced braking effectiveness on the wet runway.
(iii) The oversight was not identified by the first officer, who was required to make a spoiler deployed confirmation call, but who instead warned the commander of the need to keep the right wing from rising in the gusting crosswind conditions.
(iv) The failure of the spoiler not deployed warning lights to illuminate resulted in the crew not being alerted to their error.
(v) Although difficulties encountered during the landing in strong crosswind conditions delayed the commander's application of wheel brakes on the wet runway until the aircraft had travelled some 550 metres beyond the normal touchdown point, this delay only became a factor in the incident when compounded by the related events.
(vi) When it became apparent to the commander that normal deceleration was not being achieved, he still did not associate this with lack of lift spoiler deployment but instead assumed, incorrectly, that a braking system malfunction had occurred.
(vii) On changing over to the alternate braking system the commander momentarily released brake pedal pressure, which further reduced the aircraft's deceleration.
(viii) During the latter stages of the overrun the aircraft's deceleration reduced, probably as a result of the wet conditions on the heavy rubber deposits within the touchdown zone of the reciprocal runway.
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | AAIB |
Report number: | |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 4 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
AAIB
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft Images:
Photo: AAIB
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
11-Jan-2020 17:55 |
harro |
Added |
11-Jan-2020 17:56 |
harro |
Updated [Source, Accident report, ] |
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