Accident Fokker 50 PH-KXM,
ASN logo
 
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Date:Friday 11 May 2001
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic F50 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Fokker 50
Owner/operator:KLM Cityhopper
Registration: PH-KXM
MSN: 20252
Year of manufacture:1992
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 30
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Accident
Location:Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) -   Netherlands
Phase: Standing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM)
Destination airport:Malmö
Investigating agency: Dutch Safety Board
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
On 11 May 2001, the cockpit and cabin crew of KL1173 made all the necessary preparations for their flight from Amsterdam to Malmö. At the scheduled departure time, the crew was informed by Air Traffic Control of a short delay to their start-up. Also at this time a mechanic from Martinair (the contracted maintenance organisation for KLM Cityhopper) plugged his headset into the external service/interphone panel located on the right side of the fuselage, below the first officer’s cockpit sliding window. The mechanic remained in this position during the start delay period. When the start-up of both engines was completed, external power was removed from the aircraft and the first flight of the day before taxi scan was commenced. During this scan the first officer who was pilot flying activated the aircraft de-icing boots. The captain and first officer both visually checked the proper inflation of the de-icing boots on their respective wings and the first officer asked the mechanic to look at the tail section. A short time later a strange noise was heard apparently from the engines. At the same time the ground crew who was assisting with the external power, ran around the front of the aircraft nose and signalled frantically to the duty officer who was sitting in a vehicle parked near the aircraft nose on the captain’s side. The duty officer came out of his vehicle, looked under the aircraft, and immediately gave a hand signal to the captain to cut the engines. The mechanic had walked through the edge of the right propeller and had sustained serious injuries.

Causes
The following causal factors were identified:
• The mechanic had to perform a task for which he was not properly trained.
• The GWK allowed the mechanic to dispatch the aircraft on his own.
• The mechanic reacted on impulse to proceed to the aircraft tail.
• Due to the light conditions the mechanic did not see the propeller.
Contributing factors were:
• Neither KLC nor MME defined specific instructions for executing the visual de-icing boots check.
• There was insufficient consideration by KLC and MME organisations of the risks involved prior to the introduction of the de-icing boots check.
• There was no formal system in place for the GWK to correctly assess the capability of the mechanic.
• The mechanic did not have any line experience with propeller aircraft.
• There were no visual warnings marking the danger areas of the propeller.
• The APU was not allowed to be used to check the de-icing boots inflation system prior to engine start.
• The light conditions may have made it difficult to see the tail section of the aircraft.
The underlying causes were:
• The absence of a hazard inventory and –evaluation of the functions of departure service personnel as integral part of the company safety management system.
• Insufficient supervision on the enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: Dutch Safety Board
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

Dutch Safety Board

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
25-Sep-2020 15:40 ASN Update Bot Added
13-Jun-2022 04:48 Ron Averes Updated [Location]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2024 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org