ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 244166
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.
| Date: | Sunday 26 December 1999 |
| Time: | 18:17 LT |
| Type: |  McDonnell Douglas DC-9-83 (MD-83) |
| Owner/operator: | Aero Lloyd |
| Registration: | D-AGWB |
| MSN: | 49846/1581 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 26838 hours |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 174 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | München-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM) -
 Germany
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | München-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM) |
| Las Palmas | |
| Investigating agency: | BFU |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
At 18:17, the aircraft began its take-off run on runway 26L for a charter flight to Las Palmas. Up to the moment when the take-off was to be initiated (rotation speed VR), the take-off proceeded without any abnormalities. Upon reaching VR, it was not possible to rotate the aircraft. The control column could only be pulled to just above neutral position. The take-off was aborted. Due to the length of the runway, the aborted take-off could could be carried out without any problems.
The investigation revealed that during the preparations for take-off, due to significant tailwinds or a resulting flapping movement of the HR, loads occurred which over-pressured the spring-loaded stop on the left elevator. As a result of a considerable exceeding of the normal full deflection at the left elevator, the entire altitude control system jammed. The conceivable possibility that tailwind and the simultaneous control of the elevator by the hydraulics complemented each other in their effect is linked to preconditions that were not given in the present case.
The serious malfunction is due to the fact that the blocked altitude control was not noticed during a special check at the gate and/or during the measures taken as part of the taxiing checklist. Deficiencies in the operating instructions for the type contributed overall to the fact that the parking of the aircraft and the performance of all checks up to take-off could not be carried out with the necessary awareness of the problem. The special check had to be carried out by the staff largely at their own discretion. During the usual performance of the checks, it was not mandatory to recognise the defect on the aircraft.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
BFU 5X011-0/99
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 19-Oct-2020 10:45 | ASN Update Bot | Added |
| 13-Aug-2021 08:34 | harro | Updated [Time, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative, Accident report] |
| 13-Aug-2021 08:38 | harro | Updated [Aircraft type] |
| 19-Jan-2024 17:54 | harro | Updated [Registration, Cn, Operator, Total occupants, Other fatalities, Source] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation