ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 247860
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| Date: | Friday 28 June 2013 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Ilyushin Il-76TD |
| Owner/operator: | KAPO Avia |
| Registration: | RA-78792 |
| MSN: | 0093490718 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Novokuznetsk Àirport -
 Russia
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Unknown |
| Departure airport: | |
| Novokuznetsk Àirport | |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
While landing in the afternoon, in poor weather conditions, the airplane landed before the runway. At the same time, the first and second row approach system lights, located 30 and 60 meters away, respectively, from the threshold of the runway, were knocked down.
During visual approach, by the time of overflight of the control point (height of 100 meters), there were no landing conditions - the aircraft was 55 meters above the set glide path and had a vertical descent speed of 8.5 m/s (more than 3 m/s higher than necessary for glide path flight), and the operation of all engines was at low throttle.
The crew did not comply with the requirements of the flight manual to make a go around, but continued descending at a vertical speed of 10 meters per second and reducing the instrument speed (from 250 to 240 km / h in 25 meters). When the aircraft exited the steep descent at an altitude of 25 meters, there was a drop in indicated airspeed from 240 to 210 km/h, which is lower than the minimum allowable (219 km/h).
The maximum deviation of the aircraft from the glide path on departure from the steep descent was about 20 meters and occurred at a distance of 290 meters to the runway inlet threshold and at a height of 10 meters relative to the level of the runway inlet threshold.
By taking actions such as increasing the operation mode of all engines to nearly takeoff mode and increasing pitch to 13°, the crew was unable to prevent a rough landing. The landing occurred 65 m before the runway threshold (15 m before the beginning of the hardened section of the tarmac) and almost along the axis of the runway with a vertical descent rate of 5 m/s relative to the actual ground surface, which had an average upward slope of 2.5° at the landing zone. At the first landing, the onboard recorder K3-63 recorded the maximum ("unfiltered") value of vertical overload equal to 4.62 units, corresponding to the level of mechanical stop.
After the first rough landing, the airplane bounced 2 meters and landed again with a vertical speed of 1.5 m/s at a distance of 140 meters beyond the threshold of the runway.
Sources:
FAVT
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 15-Feb-2021 19:38 | harro | Added |
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