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Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative: TAP Air Portugal flight TP754, an Airbus A320, suffered controllability issues during a go around at Copenhagen Airport, Denmark.
During landing on runway 30 in gusty wind conditions, the commander felt uncomfortable with the aircraft attitude and decided, after thrust reversers had been selected, to abort the landing. The commander moved the thrust levers fully forward (selected TOGA thrust) which deviated from the procedure in the FCOM stipulating that once thrust reversers had been selected, the landing had to be completed. Engine no.2 thrust reverser stowed, and engine no. 2 accelerated. Engine no.1 thrust reverser did not stow, and Engine Control Unit (ECU) no.1 commanded engine no.1 to autoidle. The commander experienced difficulties in controlling and achieving the maximum capabilities of the aircraft but managed to regain control. The aircraft continued climbing and the flight crew shut down engine no.1 to regain better control of the aircraft. The aircraft subsequently landed without any further occurrences. The AIB safety investigation identified that engine no.1 thrust reverser did not stow since ECU no.1 did not receive a ground signal at the same time, as thrust lever no.1 position signal changed from reverse to forward thrust.
Factors: 1. Based on the attitude of the aircraft during landing, the commander decided to abort the landing and moved the thrust levers fully forward (TOGA) to initiate a go-around. 2. Aborting the landing after the selection of thrust reversers was a deviation from the procedures described in the FCOM and FCTM. 3. The aircraft manufacturer identified that the CFM56 ECU software design would not latch the thrust reverser stow command in case the ECU received an air signal at the same time as the thrust lever was moved forward. 4. At the time of certification of the aircraft, no requirements existed at the certifying authorities to evaluate an aborted landing during a bounced landing scenario.