ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 279242
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| Date: | Friday 19 June 2020 |
| Time: | 12:47 |
| Type: | RF Designs Mephisto |
| Owner/operator: | RF Designs |
| Registration: | unreg. |
| MSN: | HP001 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | Bruhl Airfield, QLD -
 Australia
|
| Phase: | Taxi |
| Nature: | Test |
| Departure airport: | Bruhl Airfield |
| Bruhl Airfield | |
| Investigating agency: | ATSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The pilot of an RF Designs Mephisto remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) was conducting test flights following aircraft maintenance. After completing a successful autonomous test flight, the pilot toggled the automatic mode switch to disengage the aircraft’s automatic mode for taxi back to the hangar.
The pilot then increased the throttle to provide the aircraft with sufficient momentum to taxi. As the aircraft turned towards the pilot, they determined that the aircraft was not responding to commands to reduce the engine thrust. The pilot considered attempting to arrest the aircraft by hand but determined it was moving too quickly and instead toggled the automatic mode switch to regain control of the aircraft and turn it away from bystanders.
The pilot then directed the aircraft across the airfield and it came to rest against the perimeter fence, resulting in minor damage to the aircraft’s skin.
Contributing factors
• When the throttle was advanced for taxi, the automatic mode, which had not been correctly deactivated, entered an ’abort landing’ state. This overrode the pilot’s commands to decrease throttle and the turbine thrust continued to increase, resulting in a loss of control.
• The use of a 3-position switch (with 2 positive and 1 negative position), for a 2-position role, increased the likelihood that a pilot would inadvertently not deactivate the automatic mode prior to manoeuvring the aircraft.
• The controller did not have a ’kill switch’ to override the aircraft’s automatic mode and shutdown the turbine in the event of an issue. As a result, the pilot was forced to toggle the aircraft’s mode switches and direct it away from personnel rather than being able to override it.
• The pilot was experiencing a level of fatigue known to impact performance. This likely led to a lack of reaction to multiple cues that the aircraft had not exited the automatic mode
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5781297/ao-2020-035-final.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Jun-2022 14:56 | harro | Added |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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