ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 279427
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| Date: | Saturday 10 August 2019 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Airbus A330-343 |
| Owner/operator: | Saudi Arabian Airlines |
| Registration: | HZ-AQ20 |
| MSN: | 1764 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2016 |
| Engine model: | Rolls-Royce Trent 772-B60 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Jeddah-King Abdulaziz International Airport (JED/OEJN) -
 Saudi Arabia
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Jeddah-King Abdulaziz International Airport (JED/OEJN) |
| Cairo International Airport (CAI/HECA) | |
| Investigating agency: | AIB Saudi Arabia |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
Saudi Arabia Airlines flight SV305, an Airbus A330, was involved in a serious runway incursion incident at Jeddah.
An Airfield Operations vehicle (AF-02) conducting runway inspection was on runway 34L (RWY-34L) when SV305 was cleared for takeoff on the same runway. SV305 continued its takeoff roll and rotated while the vehicle was not safely distanced from the aircraft and/or the effect of the jet blast. The flight crew were not aware of AF-02's close proximity as they rolled down the runway and rotated at VR. The Airfield Operations Officers (AOOs), in the inspection vehicle, were not monitoring the tower frequency and critically missed hearing ATC clearing SV305 for the take off. Unexpectedly and in total surprise they saw the aircraft accelerating down the runway and closing rapidly towards them. Evasively,
they immediately vacated RWY-34L by exiting on taxiway-B5 (TWY-B5).
The maneuver to separate was estimated to take 7 seconds in time and at 120 meters (m) (90m from the wing tip) in terms of the distance.
The AIB concluded:
1. SVA flight crew did not report the occurrence and may not have observed the encounter;
2. KAIA Airport Operations Control (AOC) performed well within prescribed guidelines;
3. The Airfield Operations Officers and the Local Control Aerodrome deviated from regulatory and ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The AIB also observed and listed Air Traffic Management (ATM) elements considered as contributing to the occurrence. In addition to applying ICAO’s Runway Incursion Risk Calculator assessment, the AIB evaluated this occurrence as a serious continued exposure threat to the safety of runway inspection operations regarded as a mandatory task that will always remain in practice.
Sources:
https://www.aib.gov.sa/en-us/Reports/Annual%20report%202020.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 20-Jun-2022 07:43 | harro | Added |
| 20-Jun-2022 07:44 | harro | Updated [Departure airport] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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