ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 280297
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| Date: | Saturday 9 July 2022 |
| Time: | 10:00 UTC |
| Type: |  Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage |
| Owner/operator: | R.E. Thompson & Co. (Vacuum) Ltd |
| Registration: | G-LAMI |
| MSN: | 46-36798 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2022 |
| Engine model: | Lycoming TIO-540-AE2A |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Wycombe Air Park (EGTB), Booker, Buckinghamshire, England -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Wycombe Air Park (EGTB) |
| Wycombe Air Park (EGTB) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage G-LAMI suffered an accident during an aborted takeoff from Wycombe Air Park (EGTB), Booker, Buckinghamshire, England on 9 July 2022. The incident was the subject of an AAIB Accident Investigation, and the following is the summary from the accident Investigation report:
"AAIB investigation to Piper PA-46-350P, G-LAMI: Runway overrun after rejected takeoff, Wycombe Airpark, Buckinghamshire, 9 July 2022.
The accident flight was being conducted as a prospective buyer demonstration flight with the commander, the sales representative, one potential buyer as pilot flying (PF) and three passengers onboard. The intention was to depart from Wycombe Air Park heading towards Cardiff under IFR before returning to Wycombe.
The prospective buyers were already waiting in the airfield cafe when the commander arrived to prepare for the flight. Short introductions were made and there were issues with headset availability, which needed resolving. The commander felt he was under time pressure to depart as the passengers had other commitments later in the day. The commander used the Garmin G1000 Integrated Flight Deck (IFD) system to obtain the fuel quantity on board, which he recorded as being 15 US gallons, and requested a further 50 US gallons to be uplifted which he calculated would leave 20 US gallons remaining after the flight.
The commander had previous experience of operating small charter operations and was comfortable in estimating the weight of the passengers. He performed his pre‑flights checks, takeoff calculations and filed the flight plan as the aircraft was towed to the fuel pumps and 199.93 litres (52.8 US gallons) was uplifted. By his calculations they would be at the MTOW and would require 1,700 ft of ground roll using flaps 10° for the takeoff. He did not calculate the 50 ft obstacle clearance performance.
The passengers arrived at the aircraft with the sales representative and one of the passengers was identified to occupy the right cockpit seat. He advised the commander of his experience and said he would like to do “as much flying as possible”. He asked the commander why he would take the right seat and was informed that the commander preferred to fly in the left seat for demonstration flights. Before taxiing, a short pre-flight safety briefing was given regarding the emergency exits. Control of the aircraft was passed to the PF for the taxi whilst the commander did the pre-flight checks from memory.
Power checks were completed before entering Runway 24 from point A1 and then backtracking to line up for Runway 06. The commander demonstrated a 180° turn and by his estimation they were approximately 10-15 metres (30-50 ft) from the end of the runway. Rotation (70-75 kt) and lift off (78 kt) speeds were briefed and the commander selected flaps 10°.
The PF fully advanced the throttle and shortly afterwards the commander heard a Master Warning and saw there was a red warning message on the Crew Alerting System (CAS) indicating that the Manifold Absolute Pressure (MAP) had exceeded 42 inches Hg reaching approximately 44 inches Hg. The commander placed his hand on the PF’s hand and reduced the throttle so that the MAP stabilised at approximately 36-37 inches Hg and continued with the takeoff roll.
About halfway along the runway the commander became concerned that insufficient airspeed had been achieved to continue with the takeoff. The PF recalled being told to rotate at about 55 kt and then he heard the stall warning as the aircraft pitched up. One of the passengers stated they felt the aircraft “bounce” and a witness remembers seeing a “wing wobble” associated with a momentary lift off. The commander then shouted “Stop! I have control” and immediately closed the throttle and applied as much braking as he felt possible.
The aircraft decelerated and swung to the right as it ran off the end of the runway onto the taxiway. It continued off the paved surface into the grass and in doing so caused both main landing gears to collapse. The commander estimated they were travelling “not much more than walking pace” as they went onto the grass and came to a stop shortly afterwards.
The commander completed the emergency shutdown procedure, checked the passengers were OK and commanded an evacuation. The sales representative opened the upper cabin door, but the lower half was jammed and so all the occupants had to climb out over it. The AFRS was on the scene quickly and there was a strong smell of fuel coming from the left wing.
AAIB Conclusion=
The commander made the decision to reject the takeoff when he realised there was insufficient runway remaining to takeoff. Due to the change in braking surface when the aircraft ran over the painted runway numbers, it started to skid and veered to the right.
This resulted in the aircraft skidding off the taxiway and coming to rest in the grass with the aircraft pointing approximately 100° to the runway heading. The landing gear collapsed, and the fuselage was damaged.
Several factors were identified which contributed to the takeoff being rejected. The aircraft was 376 lb above the MTOW due to misidentification of the fuel onboard prior to refueling and an underestimation of the total weight of passengers. Both of these factors may have been a consequence of the commander feeling under time pressure during the pre-flight preparations. The takeoff was started over 100 ft into the runway after the backtrack and 180° turn. The PFs lack of understanding on how to handle the MAP at the start of the takeoff resulted in a CAS warning and the subsequent reduction in MAP setting lengthened the takeoff roll. This may have been due to the lack of a pre-flight briefing of the PF and an assumption on his skill level by the commander, both of which potentially occurred due to the perceived time pressure
=Nature of Damage to airframe=
Per the Above AAIB Report "Left wing, both landing gear and fuselage damaged"
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
1. AAIB Final Report: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63905cc38fa8f569f6a9d290/Piper_PA-46-350P_G-LAMI_01-23.pdf
2. https://www.bucksfreepress.co.uk/news/20270851.investigation-launched-plane-crashes-wycombe-air-park/
3. https://www.planelogger.com/Aircraft/Registration/G-LAMI/1056555
4. NTSB Accident Number GAA22WA256
5. https://www.reddit.com/r/NTSB_database/comments/x9eupb/6_none_july_09_2022_piper_pa46_high_wycombe_uk/
6. https://bucksfire.gov.uk/incident-updates/
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wycombe_Air_Park
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 11-Jul-2022 21:20 | Geno | Added |
| 11-Jul-2022 22:33 | Dr. John Smith | Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Other fatalities, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Source, Narrative, Category] |
| 11-Jul-2022 22:34 | Dr. John Smith | Updated [Aircraft type] |
| 12-Jul-2022 05:31 | RobertMB | Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative] |
| 21-Jul-2022 05:57 | Anon. | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration] |
| 21-Jul-2022 05:59 | harro | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Source, Narrative] |
| 04-Dec-2023 14:13 | harro | Updated [Other fatalities] |
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