Loss of control Accident McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F N554FE,
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Date:Saturday 14 June 2008
Time:13:15 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic DC10 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F
Owner/operator:FedEx
Registration: N554FE
MSN: 46708/62
Year of manufacture:1972
Total airframe hrs:86958 hours
Engine model:General Electric CF6-6D
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Category:Accident
Location:Raymond, Pennsylvania -   United States of America
Phase: En route
Nature:Unknown
Departure airport:Memphis International Airport, TN (MEM/KMEM)
Destination airport:New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK/KJFK)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
According to the captain, the flight was uneventful until shortly before the airplane entered a holding pattern at FL330. The speed calculated by the flight management system (FMS) was 230 knots, 5 knots above the Vmin speed for the configuration and weight of the airplane. Both pilots expected the FMS to automatically default to the ICAO maximum holding speed of 265 knots, as described in the company flight manual. However, the captain decided to command the FMS to maintain 240 knots to increase the buffer between the holding speed and Vmin. Upon reaching the pattern fix, the airplane automatically banked left to enter holding and the captain noticed that the airspeed was lessening from 240 knots. He expected the airspeed to recover once the turn was completed. He also expected the bank to be limited to 15 degrees, but the autopilot actually commanded 23 degrees. Upon completing the turn, the airspeed was approximately 5 knots below Vmin. The captain expected the airspeed to recover now that the airplane was wings level. However, this did not occur, and when appropriate, the airplane started to automatically turn to the inbound holding heading. The crew then requested and was granted a clearance to descend to FL320 in the holding pattern. The captain then selected level change on the FMS to 320 and he also reduced the autobank controller to 15 degrees, from 23 degrees. During the descending turn, with the airspeed at about 220 knots, the first officer recommended extending the slats. The maximum slat extension speed at that juncture was 270 knots, according to the captain. When the slats extended, the maximum slat extension speed indicator on the airspeed indicator fell to below 220 knots. The captain then immediately ordered the first officer to retract the slats. He stated that at this point the airplane began to buffet, and an autoslat extension alert occurred. The first officer requested a further descent and was cleared to FL290. The captain then selected a level change on the FMS to 290. The buffeting ceased when the airplane was passing approximately FL300 during this descent. The flight landed uneventfully; however, the buffeting had caused substantial damage to both elevators and right horizontal stabilizer that was discovered during a post-flight inspection. According to the flight data recorder data and an analysis of that data by the airplane's manufacturer, the slats were extended by the flight crew when the airspeed was 205 knots, well below the maximum slat extension speed of 260 knots. However the Mach number at that time was 0.59, well above the 0.51 Mach minimum slat extension speed. The target Mach then became 0.51, and the autothrottles reduced from 100% N1 rpm to about 50% N1 rpm. When the slats were retracted by the flight crew, the autothrottles advanced the thrust back to 100% N1 rpm. However, by the time the engine thrust had recovered, the airspeed had dropped to about 180 knots. The stick shakers activated about 5 seconds later and continued to operate for approximately one minute.

Probable Cause: The flight crew's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's airspeed during the holding pattern, leading to the onset of an aerodynamic stall and subsequent structural damage to the tail from buffet.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: DCA08FA075
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 3 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

NTSB DCA08FA075

History of this aircraft

Other occurrences involving this aircraft
30 December 1988 N153AA American Airlines 0 Atlantic Ocean, AO non

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
02-Oct-2022 17:39 ASN Update Bot Added

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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