ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 346073
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| Date: | Saturday 12 September 2020 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Airbus A318-111 |
| Owner/operator: | Air France |
| Registration: | F-GUGM |
| MSN: | 2750 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2006 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-5B8/P |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 86 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | near Paris-Orly Airport -
 France
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Biarritz Parme Airport (BIQ/LFBZ) |
| Paris-Orly Airport (ORY/LFPO) | |
| Investigating agency: | BEA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
In descent to Paris-Orly airport, the crew took the opportunity of following a shortened route proposed by the approach controller. The captain (PF) decided to carry out a fast approach, outside the profile specified in the SOP. The radar vectors brought the aeroplane to two dots above the Glideslope, after the gate recommended by the Orly unit (chevron) on the final path. The PF?s strategy was first of all, to maintain 250 kt and to increase the vertical speed to join the approach slope, and then once on the slope, to reduce the speed in order to be able to configure the aeroplane for landing. This led to a temporary deviation from the approach slope. At 6 NM from the threshold of runway 25, at 2,287 ft (2,000 ft AAL), stabilization was compromised. The crew, who already had a high workload, did not then have the necessary resources to identify that the approach could not be stabilized at 500 ft. At 5.5 NM from the threshold of runway 25, the PF asked for the flaps to be extended to configuration 1. Shortly after, the co-pilot (PM) modified the final configuration for landing, both on the FMS and the overhead panel which probably contributed to his monitoring of the flight parameters becoming less effective. At the same time, having the runway in sight, the PF?s eyes left the instruments. He made a nose-down input which resulted in a high vertical speed which led to the activation of the GPWS warning on board and the MSAW in the tower. Subsequent to this, continuing the approach was not called into question. The PM had a very high workload, between monitoring the flight path, carrying out the radio communications and continuing the configuration of the aeroplane. At 500 ft AAL, the crew considered that the aeroplane was in the process of stabilizing. They chose to continue as they were convinced that both the stabilization would be quickly acquired after 500 ft and that the landing could be carried out safely.Without being aware of it, the crew, at this point, probably had very few mental resources available to deal with an unexpected event.A posteriori, after landing, the absence of consequences in continuing the approach probably reinforced the crew?s belief that their decision had been the right one.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/incident-to-the-airbus-a318-registered-f-gugm-operated-by-air-france-on-12-09-2020-near-paris-orly/
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 29-Sep-2023 16:43 | harro | Added |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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