ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 385633
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Date: | Monday 9 July 2001 |
Time: | 17:25 LT |
Type: | Hughes 269A |
Owner/operator: | Private |
Registration: | N7028V |
MSN: | 76-0622 |
Total airframe hrs: | 5631 hours |
Engine model: | Lycoming HT-36A |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | Clay, NY -
United States of America
|
Phase: | En route |
Nature: | Private |
Departure airport: | Fulton-Oswego County Airport, NY (KFZY) |
Destination airport: | Syracuse-Hancock International Airport, NY (SYR/KSYR) |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:The helicopter was in cruise flight when the pilot heard a "bang," and lost tailrotor authority. The pilot maneuvered for landing, and then reduced airspeed in anticipation of landing. The helicopter began to rotate. About 30 to 50 feet agl, the pilot pulled collective to cushion the landing. The helicopter impacted the ground and rolled onto its side. The helicopter received an annual inspection 11 months and 23.3 flight hours prior to the accident. During the annual inspection, the mechanic documented that airworthiness directive (AD) 76-18-01 had been complied with. Examination of the left aft cluster fitting revealed that the tailboom attaching point had separated severing the tailrotor drive shaft. The fracture surfaces for the cluster fitting were relatively flat with smooth curving boundaries, "features typical of fatigue." Most of the relatively rough area in the lower lug had curving arrest lines, "features typical of low-cycle fatigue." AD 76-18-01 stated that within 50 flight hours of the effective date of the AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours of flight time, or until modifications are accomplished, the tailboom support strut aluminum end fittings were to be visually inspected for deformation or damage, and then checked for cracking using dye penetrant. If cracking or damage was identified the effected structure would have had to been replaced. The AD required the dye penetrant inspection be done in accordance with Service Information Notice N-82.3. In addition, the Service Information Notice stated that a daily visual inspection was required, which the pilot stated he performed prior to the flight.
Probable Cause: Failure of the left aft cluster fitting due to a fatigue crack. Factors in the accident were the mechanic's failure to identify the crack at the last annual inspection, and the pilot's failure to identify the crack during the last daily inspection
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Report number: | NYC01LA167 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 5 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
NTSB NYC01LA167
Location
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
05-Apr-2024 06:18 |
ASN Update Bot |
Added |
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