Accident Hughes 269A N7028V,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 385633
 
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Date:Monday 9 July 2001
Time:17:25 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic H269 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Hughes 269A
Owner/operator:Private
Registration: N7028V
MSN: 76-0622
Total airframe hrs:5631 hours
Engine model:Lycoming HT-36A
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Category:Accident
Location:Clay, NY -   United States of America
Phase: En route
Nature:Private
Departure airport:Fulton-Oswego County Airport, NY (KFZY)
Destination airport:Syracuse-Hancock International Airport, NY (SYR/KSYR)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The helicopter was in cruise flight when the pilot heard a "bang," and lost tailrotor authority. The pilot maneuvered for landing, and then reduced airspeed in anticipation of landing. The helicopter began to rotate. About 30 to 50 feet agl, the pilot pulled collective to cushion the landing. The helicopter impacted the ground and rolled onto its side. The helicopter received an annual inspection 11 months and 23.3 flight hours prior to the accident. During the annual inspection, the mechanic documented that airworthiness directive (AD) 76-18-01 had been complied with. Examination of the left aft cluster fitting revealed that the tailboom attaching point had separated severing the tailrotor drive shaft. The fracture surfaces for the cluster fitting were relatively flat with smooth curving boundaries, "features typical of fatigue." Most of the relatively rough area in the lower lug had curving arrest lines, "features typical of low-cycle fatigue." AD 76-18-01 stated that within 50 flight hours of the effective date of the AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours of flight time, or until modifications are accomplished, the tailboom support strut aluminum end fittings were to be visually inspected for deformation or damage, and then checked for cracking using dye penetrant. If cracking or damage was identified the effected structure would have had to been replaced. The AD required the dye penetrant inspection be done in accordance with Service Information Notice N-82.3. In addition, the Service Information Notice stated that a daily visual inspection was required, which the pilot stated he performed prior to the flight.

Probable Cause: Failure of the left aft cluster fitting due to a fatigue crack. Factors in the accident were the mechanic's failure to identify the crack at the last annual inspection, and the pilot's failure to identify the crack during the last daily inspection

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: NYC01LA167
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 5 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

NTSB NYC01LA167

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
05-Apr-2024 06:18 ASN Update Bot Added

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