ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 43239
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| Date: | Sunday 9 May 1999 |
| Time: | 07:46 LT |
| Type: |  Aerostar RX-8 |
| Owner/operator: | Balloons By The Sea |
| Registration: | N70290 |
| MSN: | RX8-3214 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 90 hours |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 3 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Morgan Hill, CA -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Unknown |
| Departure airport: | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
In the takeoff initial climb, the balloon contacted power lines, caught fire, and crashed into a field. The pilot setup the balloon for takeoff from a 798-foot-long open field, 298 feet upwind from 21,000-volt power lines. The FAA approved flight manual specifies that a horizontal distance of 100 feet for each 1-knot of wind speed be allowed between the takeoff point and any obstacle in the takeoff path. During the envelope inflation process, a 7- to 10-mph surface wind developed, which started dragging the basket toward the lines. The pilot elected to continue with the planned flight. He and the two fare-paying passengers took off and drifted into the power lines, which shorted and arced. An unapproved aluminum fuel tank in the basket ruptured and ignited the basket, envelope, and occupants. The pilot jumped from the basket and sustained serious injuries. The passengers remained in the basket and succumbed to thermal injuries. The balloon had been modified by the addition of an uncertified aluminum fuel tank to the two existing factory tanks that were composed of steel. During postaccident examination of the wreckage, a fuel line to one of the two burners was found not connected; with one burner inoperative, the balloon's climb capability was significantly reduced. The envelope's emergency deflation panel was found in the closed position and subsequent testing found it functional. According to the flight manual, the pilot's preflight actions should have included providing safety helmets to the passengers, ascertaining the winds aloft by launching a pibal, and ensuring that both burners were connected to fuel tanks and operational; none of the actions were completed. In addition, the pilot did not vent activate the envelope's emergency deflation panel to land when the collision with the power lines was eminent.
Probable Cause: The pilot's selection of an inadequate takeoff site that did not allow sufficient horizontal clearance from obstacles in the takeoff path, and, his failure to ensure that all burners were connected to fuel sources, which reduced the available climb capability of the balloon. Also causal was the pilot's failure to activate the emergency vent panel and land prior to contact with the power lines, and, his use of an unapproved aluminum fuel tank, which ruptured during the power line contact and ignited a fire. A factor in the accident was the pilot's failure before takeoff to use pibals to quantify the wind speed.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
NTSB LAX99FA177
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 24-Oct-2008 10:30 | ASN archive | Added |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:24 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 26-Nov-2017 15:16 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 08-Apr-2024 06:11 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Other fatalities, Phase, Source, Narrative, Plane category, Category, Accident report] |
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