ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 83059
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.
| Date: | Saturday 27 November 2010 |
| Time: | 01:24 |
| Type: |  Airbus A340-313X |
| Owner/operator: | Finnair |
| Registration: | OH-LQD |
| MSN: | 921 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2008 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-5C4 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 272 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH) -
 Hong Kong
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH) |
| Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK) | |
| Investigating agency: | CAD Hong Kong |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The incident occurred at night time during which FIN070 was cleared by ATC to taxi on Taxiway B westbound for departure on Runway 07L. When the aircraft was approaching the western end of Taxiway B, ATC cleared the aircraft for take-off on Runway 07L. The aircraft took the normal right turn at the end of Taxiway B towards Runway 07L but then took a premature right turn onto Taxiway A, a taxiway parallel to and in between the runway-in-use and Taxiway B. With the help of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) provided in the Control Tower, ATC observed that the aircraft commenced take-off roll on Taxiway A. On detecting the anomaly, ATC immediately instructed the pilot to stop rolling and the aircraft was stopped abeam Taxiway A5, approximately 1400 metres from the beginning (western end) of Taxiway A.
The following causal factors were identified:
1 A combination of sudden surge in cockpit workload and the difficulties experienced by both the Captain and the First Officer in stowing the EFB computers at a critical point of taxiing shortly before take-off had distracted their attention from the external environment that resulted in a momentary degradation of situation awareness.
2 The SOP did not provide a sufficiently robust process for the verification of the departure runway before commencement of the take-off roll.
3 The safety defence of having the First Officer and the Relief Pilot to support and monitor the Captain’s taxiing was not sufficiently effective as the Captain was the only person in the cockpit trained for ground taxi.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/Etusivu/1290609240897
http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/B-LAT1-2011.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 03-Dec-2010 13:50 | harro | Added |
| 23-Dec-2010 15:11 | harro | Updated [Date, Time, Total occupants, Source, Narrative] |
| 13-Jan-2012 14:17 | harro | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 09-Apr-2021 15:26 | harro | Updated [Narrative, Accident report] |
| 09-Apr-2021 16:43 | harro | Updated [Source] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2024 Flight Safety Foundation