Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Datum: | vrijdag 25 oktober 1968 |
Tijd: | 18:10 |
Type: |  Fairchild FH-227C |
Luchtvaartmaatschappij: | Northeast Airlines |
Registratie: | N380NE |
Constructienummer: | 517 |
Bouwjaar: | 1966 |
Aantal vlieguren: | 3828 |
Motoren: | 2 Rolls-Royce Dart 532-7 |
Bemanning: | slachtoffers: 2 / inzittenden: 3 |
Passagiers: | slachtoffers: 30 / inzittenden: 39 |
Totaal: | slachtoffers: 32 / inzittenden: 42 |
Schade: | Vernield |
Gevolgen: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Plaats: | 15,2 km (9.5 mijl) NE of Lebanon Airport, NH (LEB) ( Verenigde Staten)
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Fase: | Nadering (APR) |
Soort vlucht: | Binnenlandse lijnvlucht |
Vliegveld van vertrek: | Boston-Logan International Airport, MA (BOS/KBOS), Verenigde Staten |
Vliegveld van aankomst: | Lebanon Regional Airport, NH (LEB/KLEB), Verenigde Staten |
Vluchtnummer: | 946 |
Beschrijving:Northeast Airlines Flight 946, Fairchild FH-227C, departed Boston-Logan International Airport, USA at 17:42 hours for a flight to Lebanon, NH and Montpelier, VT. The Fairchild climbed to a cruising altitude of 8000 feet. At 18:08 the flight was cleared for an approach to the Lebanon Airport to cruise at 5,000 feet and report leaving 6,000 feet. At 18:10:45, the controller advised the crew that radar service had been terminated and the flight was cleared to contact the Lebanon Flight Service Station (FSS). One minute later the FSS told the crew that the weather was an estimated ceiling of 2,000 feet overcast; visibility was 10 miles; there were breaks in the overcast; the altimeter setting was 29.55; and the wind was calm.
The flight did not perform the published instrument approach procedure but executed an abbreviated approach by making a right turn from their northwesterly heading and then a left turn back to intercept the inbound radial to the VOR station. The inbound radial was intercepted at approximately 8 to 10 miles northeast of the VOR station where it passed through an altitude of about 4500 feet. The crew began the descent but did not level off at 2,800 feet m.s.l., the minimum altitude inbound to the VOR. During the approach to runway 25 the airplane contacted trees on the cloud-shrouded side of a steep, rocky, heavily wooded mountain (Moose Mountain), 57 feet below the summit at 2,237 feet m.s.l. The aircraft cut a swath trough the trees broke up and caught fire.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The premature initiation of a descent towards the Minimum Descent Altitude, based on navigational instrument indications of an impending station passage in an area of course roughness. The crew was not able to determine accurately its position at this time because they had performed a non standard instrument approach and there were no supplement navigational aids available for their use."
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 5 months | Accident number: | NTSB/AAR-70-07 | Download report: | Final report
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Veiligheidsmaatregelen
Acting upon an NTSB recommendation, the FAA on Nov.7, 1968 issued an Operations and Maintenance Alert regarding the erratic operation and false reversals of Wilcox 806 VOR receivers. One month later the FAA issued Advisory Circular No. 91-18, regarding course needle oscillations on VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR) receivers. The Wilcox company also took action to recommending three modifications to the Wilcox 806A receiver to improve the performance of the receiver.
NTSB issued 2 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 29-OCT-1968 | To: FAA | A-68-29 |
TAKE IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONARY ACTION TO RESTRICT ALL OPERATORS USING THIS TYPE OF WILCOX VOR RECEIVER EQUIPMENT TO VISUAL APPROACHES WHERE RADAR OR DME IS NOT AVAILABLE AND REQUIRE VISUAL FLIGHT DURING EN ROUTE OPERATIONS WHERE AN EXACT FIX REQUIREMENT IS NECESSARY FOR TERRAIN AVOIDANCE, IF DME OR RADAR VERIFICATION IS NOT AVAILABLE. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 05-DEC-1968 | To: | A-68-33 |
WE WOULD, THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT THE FAA CONDUCT LONG TERM RADIO FREQUENCY MONITORING OF THE LEBANON VOR AREA FOR SIGNAL INTERFERENCE. THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT PRIORITY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE INSTALLATION OF DUAL NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES AT THOSE LOCATIONS WHERE A SINGLE FACILITY COULD EXHIBIT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TYPE FOUND DURING OUR INVESTIGATION OF THE LEBANON ACCIDENT. THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT A REVIEW BE MADE OF THE DESIGN CONCEPT OF THE WILCOX MODEL 806A RECEIVER AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER AIRBORNE INSTRUMENTATION AND GROUND STATION NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT TO ASSURE STANDARDS OF AIRWORTHINESS. FURTHERMORE, THE FACTS DISCLOSED DURING OUR INVESTIGATION OF THIS ACCIDENT INDICATE TO US THAT THIS COMPATIBILITY PROBLEM MAY BE GENERAL IN NATURE AND THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO REVIEWING ALL PERTINENT STANDARDS FOR COMPATIBILITY OF GROUND AND AIRBORNE NAVIGATION COMPONENTS. FAA SHOULD PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING AN INDUSTRYWIDE OPERATIONAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. IN MOVING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WOULD GIVE EARLY ATTENTION TO INSURING A WIDER DISSEMINATION OF EXISTING OPERATIONAL INCIDENT DATA AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF YOUR ORGANIZATION. OUR FINAL RECOMMENDATION CONCERNS THE REEMPHASIS OF WHAT COCKPIT INDICATIONS CONSTITUTE POSITIVE STATION PASSAGE DURING A VOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Foto's

accident date:
25-10-1968type: Fairchild FH-227C
registration: N380NE
Kaart
Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft
niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Boston-Logan International Airport, MA en Lebanon Regional Airport, NH bedraagt 174 km (109 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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Fairchild FH-227
- 78 built
- 2e ongeval
- 2e dodelijk ongeval
- 2e zwaarste ongeval (toen het plaatsvond)
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