| Estado: | Final |
| Fecha: | domingo 3 marzo 1974 |
| Hora: | 12:42 |
| Tipo: |  McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 |
| Operador: | Türk Hava Yollari - THY |
| Registración: | TC-JAV |
| Numéro de série: | 46704/29 |
| Año de Construcción: | 1972 |
| Horas Totales de la Célula: | 2955 |
| Ciclos: | 1537 |
| Motores: | 3 General Electric CF6-6D |
| Tripulación: | Fatalidades: 11 / Ocupantes: 11 |
| Pasajeros: | Fatalidades: 335 / Ocupantes: 335 |
| Total: | Fatalidades: 346 / Ocupantes: 346 |
| Daños en la Aeronave: | Destruido |
| Consecuencias: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Ubicación: | Bois d'Ermenonville ( Francia)
|
| Fase: | En ruta (ENR) |
| Naturaleza: | Vuelo Internacional Programado |
| Aeropuerto de Salida: | Paris-Orly Airport (ORY/LFPO), Francia |
| London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL), Reino Unido | |
| Número de Vuelo: | TK981 |
On Sunday March 3, 1974 flight TK981 departed Istanbul for a flight to Paris and London. The DC-10 landed at Paris-Orly at 11:02 and taxied to stand A2. There were 167 passengers on board, of whom 50 disembarked. The aircraft was refueled and baggage was loaded onto the plane. The planned turnaround time of one hour was delayed by 30 minutes. An additional 216 passengers embarked. Most of the passengers were booked on this flight because of a strike at British Airways. The door of the aft cargo compartment on the left-hand side was closed at about 11:35. When all preparations were complete the flight received permission to taxi to runway 08 at 12:24. Four minutes later the crew were cleared to line up for departure and were cleared for departure route 181 and an initial climb to flight level 40. The aircraft took off at approximately 12:30 and was cleared by Orly Departure to climb to FL60, which was reached at 12:34. The North Area Control Centre then cleared TK981 further to FL230. Three or four seconds before 12:40:00 hours, the noise of decompression was heard and the co-pilot said: "the fuselage has burst" and the pressurization aural warning sounded. This was caused by the opening and separation of the aft left-hand cargo door. The pressure difference in the cargo bay and passenger cabin, the floor above the cargo door partly collapsed. Two occupied tripe seat units were ejected from the aircraft. All the horizontal stabilizer and elevator control cables routed beneath the floor of the DC-10 and were thus also severely disrupted. Also the no. 2 engine power was lost almost completely. The aircraft turned 9 deg to the left and pitched nose down. The nose-down attitude increased rapidly to -20 deg. Although the no. 1 and 3 engines were throttled back the speed increased to 360 kts. The pitch attitude then progressively increased to -4 degrees and the speed became steady at 430 kts (800 km/h). At a left bank of 17 degrees the DC-10 crashed into the forest of Ermenonville, 37 km NE of Paris.
Probable Cause:
Causa Probable del Accidente:
El accidente fue causado por la separación de la puerta del compartimiento de carga del lado izquierdo trasero del avión. La súbita de-presurización que siguió llevo al colapso del piso, hacienda que seis pasajeros y partes del jet fueran succionados hacia afuera. Esto daño la Segunda turbina del jet, y daño los controles de vuelo (superficie de la cola) por lo que se le hizo imposible a los pilotos controlar el avión. El factor preponderante en la secuencia de eventos que llevaron al accidente fue el no asegurar bien la cerradura de la puerta del avión antes del despegue del jet. Las características del diseño de este mecanismo causaron que aparentemente esta puerta estuviera trancada cuando en realidad los seguros de los candados no habían sellado bien. Sin embargo, había una ventanilla de revisión para asegurarse la puerta estaba debidamente cerrada.
El cierre defectivo de esta puerta fue resultado de la combinación de varios factores tales como:
* El no aplicar correctamente las instrucciones del boletín de servicio 52-37.
* Modificaciones incorrectas y ajustes que hicieron que la cerradura no trancara bien, y por tanto no apagara debidamente la luz de aviso de esa puerta de carga.
* La manera en que se cerró la puerta durante la escala en el aeropuerto Orly. Resalta el fallo de la inspección visual a través de la ventanilla de revisión para verificar que la puerta cerró bien, aun si la inspección de la cerradura era difícil debido al diámetro inadecuado de la ventanilla de revisión.
Finalmente, aun si había redundancia aparentemente de los sistemas de control de vuelo, el hecho de que los escapes de presión entre el compartimiento de carga y la cabina de pasajeros eran inadecuados, y que todos los cables de control de vuelo estaban justamente ubicados dentro del piso sobre este compartimiento pusieron al jet en grave riesgo en caso de una súbita despresurización, causando grandes daños en esa parte de la estructura.
Todos esos riesgos ya habían sido evidentes 19 meses antes en el accidente del Windsor (Vuelo 96 de American Airlines). Aun así, no se tomaron las medidas eficaces para corregir este problema.
Accident investigation:
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Fuentes:
» ICAO Circular 132-AN/93 (116-125)Fotos
TC-JAV
TC-JAV
TC-JAV
TC-JAV
TC-JAV
accident date: 03-03-1974
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10
registration: TC-JAV
accident date: 03-03-1974
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10
registration: TC-JAV
accident date: 03-03-1974
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10
registration: TC-JAV
accident date: 03-03-1974
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10
registration: TC-JAV
accident date: 03-03-1974
type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10
registration: TC-JAV
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Paris-Orly Airport to London-Heathrow Airport as the crow flies is 364 km (227 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.
Distance from Paris-Orly Airport to London-Heathrow Airport as the crow flies is 364 km (227 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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