Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | vendredi 19 septembre 1986 |
Heure: | 14:58 |
Type/Sous-type: |  Embraer EMB-120RT Brasilia |
Operated by: | Atlantic Southeast Airlines - ASA |
On behalf of: | Delta Connection |
Immatriculation: | N219AS |
Numéro de série: | 120019 |
Année de Fabrication: | 1986 |
Heures de vol: | 12 |
Moteurs: | 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW115 |
Equipage: | victimes: 3 / à bord: 3 |
Passagers: | victimes: 2 / à bord: 2 |
Total: | victimes: 5 / à bord: 5 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Détruit |
Conséquences: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Lieu de l'accident: | près de Mantiqueira, SP ( Brésil)
|
Élévation des lieux de l'accident: | 1524 m (5000 feet) amsl |
Phase de vol: | En vol (ENR) |
Nature: | Convoyage |
Aéroport de départ: | São José dos Campos Airport, SP (SJK/SBSJ), Brésil |
Aéroport de destination: | Brasília International Airport, DF (BSB/SBBR), Brésil |
Détails:The aircraft operated on a delivery flight from the Embraer factory at São José dos Campos Airport. Atlantic Southeast Airlines was taking delivery of the aircraft and the first ferry legs would take the aircraft to Brasília and Manaus.
The flight was cleared by the São José Tower controller to follow the 010 degrees radial to the SJC VOR, and cross the VOR at 5000 feet.
Some time after takeoff São José Tower instructed the flight to climb to FL280 out of 5000 feet and intercept the 352 radial of the SJC VOR. The flight crew failed to follow the instructions. This was not noticed when the crew contacted Brasília ACC.
The airplane continued at 5000 feet until it struck a cloud covered mountain in the Mantiqueira Mountains at an elevation of 5000 feet, 700 feet below the peak.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE (translated from Portuguese):
- The pilots did not plan the flight properly, though there was an AIS room with the necessary sources of consultation. Maintaining altitude of 5000 feet for too long a time, subject to the minimum safe altitudes in the are area in the available publications, and the discrepancies found in the flight plan confirm this thesis.
- The pilot did not properly collated the guidelines issued by the tower and remained incompatible altitude with instructions issued by the control.
- There are strong indications that the flight proceeded under instrument flight conditions.
- There was no proper coordination between the ACC BS and TWR SJ regarding the transference and control of the air traffic nor did TWR SJ requested receipt of the messages.
Sources:
» Flight International 4 October 1986
» ICAO Adrep Summary 5/94 (#45)
» SIPAER final report
Opérations de secours
NTSB issued 6 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 20-JUN-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-44 |
ESTABLISH WITHIN THE AGENCY A UNIT WITH EXPERTISE IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, TO PROVIDE TO INSPECTORS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEEING AIR CARRIERS ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE IN PERFORMING SURVEILLANCE OF SUCH OPERATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-JUN-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-45 |
PROVIDE TO AIR CARRIERS ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, GUIDANCE ON THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION ON FACTORS THAT COULD AFFECT THE SAFETY OF SUCH OPERATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-JUN-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-46 |
CONDUCT PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THE OPERATING PROCEDURES AND TRAINING PROGRAMS OF AIR CARRIERS ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, BY A UNIT WITH EXPERTISE IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, TO VERIFY THAT THE PROCEDURES AND TRAINING PROGRAMS ADEQUATELY ADDRESS FACTORS THAT COULD AFFECT THE SAFETY OF SUCH OPERATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-JUN-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-47 |
REVIEW THE FLIGHT TRAINING PROGRAMS AND FAA-ACCEPTED MANUALS OF AIR CARRIERS OPERATING UNDER 14 CFR PART 135 AND 14 CFR PART 121 WITH GPWS-EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT, AND VERIFY THAT FLIGHTCREWS ARE TRAINED AND ARE REQUIRED TO IMMEDIATELY EXECUTE A TERRAIN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER WHEN A GPWS ALERT IS SOUNDED, AND TERRAIN CANNOT BE VISUALLY IDENTIFIED OR A SAFE DISTANCE FROM TERRAIN CANNOT BE ASSURED BY OTHER MEANS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-JUN-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-48 |
DEVELOP MINIMUM LEVELS OF EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS FOR EACH PILOT-IN-COMMAND AND SECOND-IN-COMMAND PILOT, AND PROHIBIT THE OPERATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT IN WHICH BOTH PILOTS FAIL TO MEET THE ESTABLISHED MINIMUM LEVELS OF EXPERIENCE IN SUCH OPERATIONS. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 20-JUN-1989 | To: FAA | A-89-49 |
ENCOURAGE PILOTS TO REPORT FLYING EXPERIENCES THAT ARE UNIQUE TO INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS TO NASA\'S AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM. (Closed - Acceptable Alternate Action) |
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Photos
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre São José dos Campos Airport, SP et Brasília International Airport, DF est de 844 km (527 miles).
Accident location: Global; accuracy within tens or hundreds of kilometers.
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.