Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Friday 8 September 1989 |
Time: | 16:38 |
Type: |  Convair CV-580 |
Operator: | Partnair |
Registration: | LN-PAA |
MSN: | 56 |
First flight: | 1953 |
Total airframe hrs: | 36943 |
Cycles: | 15116 |
Engines: | 2 Allison 501-D13D |
Crew: | Fatalities: 5 / Occupants: 5 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 50 / Occupants: 50 |
Total: | Fatalities: 55 / Occupants: 55 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | 18 km (11.3 mls) N off Hirtshals [Skagerrak] ( Denmark)
|
Phase: | En route (ENR) |
Nature: | Int'l Non Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Oslo-Fornebu Airport (FBU/ENFB), Norway |
Destination airport: | Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Airport (HAM/EDDH), Germany |
Flightnumber: | 394 |
Narrative:Convair CV-580 LN-PAA was on a charter flight from Oslo-Fornebu (FBU) to Hamburg (HAM). The flight was due to depart at 15:00 hrs. The departure was delayed by almost an hour due to the CAA Norway and the catering company having suspended Partnair´s credit. Once the financial problem was settled the crew was given permission to depart.
During the period September 6-8, 1989 LN-PAA experienced some technical problems with the left AC power system. The AC generator was replaced, but the malfunction in the system remained. On the flight to Hamburg it was decided to use the APU generator as the electrical power source for the left AC system.
LN-PAA took off at 15:59:50. The flight proceeded normally to the planned cruise level, which was FL220. At 16:04 Flight 394 was cleared direct to AAL VOR/DME (Aalborg). When the aircraft climbed through FL180 at 16:16, the crew was informed by Oslo ACC about strong westerly winds at altitude. The air traffic controller suggested a 101 heading change to the right. At 16:22 Flight 394 was informed that the radar service from Oslo ACC terminated and that the flight would enter Danish-controlled air space in 2 minutes. The flight was then requested to contact Copenhagen ACC. The airplane reached its cruising level at 16:23. Half a minute later the crew established contact with Copenhagen ACC and informed them that PAR 394 was maintaining FL220, whereupon Copenhagen ACC confirmed that they had radar contact. This was the last radio contact with the flight. The flight proceeded normally until about 16:38.
Vibrations occurred in the vertical stabilizer. These vibrations developed into violent oscillations or flutter of the horizontal tail surfaces and rudder. Vital parts of the tail section then failed and the crew lost control of the airplane. Both wings failed simultaneously under negative G loads. The Convair fell into the sea.
Probable Cause:
CAUSES: "The accident was caused by loss of control due to the destruction of primary control surfaces in the tail section, which, in turn, was caused by aeroelastic oscillations initiated by abnormal clearances in the vertical stabiliser attachments to the fuselage structure.
The condition of the attachments was a result of excessive wear in pins and sleeves used in this structural joint. The pins and sleeves were of an inferior quality and did not satisfy specified values for hardness and tensile strength. They had also been installed and inspected using sub-standard maintenance procedures. Undamped oscillations in the elevator contributed to the structural failure of the empennage."
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | HSL Norway  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years and 5 months | Accident number: | HAV 02/93 | Download report: | Final report
|
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Classification:
Wrong installation of parts
Tail failure
Loss of control
Sources:
» Aviation Week & Space Technology 29.03.1993 (32-33)
» Flight International 31 March-6 April 1993 (13)
» ICAO Adrep Summary 5/89 (#23)
Follow-up / safety actions
AAIB-N issued 3 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 12-FEB-1993 | To: | LN-PAA (1) |
The AAIB/N recommends that the CAA/N considers adjusting the existing supervisory system to improve its ability to deal with aircraft requiring special attention.
Old aircraft and aircraft with a high number of operating hours may not necessarily require special attention if they have been properly maintained. Other decisive factors, over and above old age and a large number of operating hours, which may require special attention are:
- the aircraft has been operated and/or maintained by several owners and maintenance organisations with various operational arrangements
- the aircraft has been subject to a number of extensive modifications
- the aircraft has been in service in a corrosive environment
Included in this recommendation is a requirement for aviation authorities to follow up the introduction of a mandatory quality assurance system. |
Issued: 12-FEB-1993 | To: | LN-PAA (2) |
This investigation has revealed a history of vibration problems in the empennage on this type of aircraft which was not known to all operators. In other cases it has been found that important information did not reach all those operators to which the information applied. The AAIB/N recommends that the CAA/N reviews the requirement for new operators to obtain access to an aircraft\'s operations and maintenance history. This requirement should apply when primary acceptance inspections are being carried out. |
Issued: 12-FEB-1993 | To: | LN-PAA (3) |
The AAIB/N recommends that the CAA/N considers establishing a requirement for operators to keep an updated "Master Flight Manual" at the aircraft\'s home base. |
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Photos

accident date:
08-09-1989type: Convair CV-580
registration: LN-PAA

accident date:
08-09-1989type: Convair CV-580
registration: LN-PAA

accident date:
08-09-1989type: Convair CV-580
registration: LN-PAA
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Oslo-Fornebu Airport to Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Airport as the crow flies is 692 km (433 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.