Narrative:American Connection flight 5966 departed Saint Louis (STL) at 18:42 on a flight to Kirksville (IRK). When 23 minutes from Kirksville, the weather report included a 4 mile visibility in mist with an overcast ceiling at 300 feet. Kirksville does not have an ILS, but the crew decided to continue. A few minutes later the flight was cleared to descend from FL120 to 8000 feet in preparation for a localizer DME approach to runway 36. At 19:20 the weather report now indicated that the visibility had decreased to 3 miles. After reaching 8000 feet ARTCC cleared the crew further down to 3000 feet after which the captain briefed the approach. After receiving some vectors for runway 36 the captain levelled off at 3100 feet. At 19:30 the flight was 11 miles from the final approach fix (FAF) and the crew cleared for the approach. Flaps and landing gear were selected down and descent was started, tracking the localizer. At 19:36 the flight descended through 1450 feet. The GPWS sounded: "five hundred." When reaching the minimum descent altitude the GPWS sounded: "minimums, minimums", and the captain stated: "I can see the ground there." The first officer could not see the ground. Descent was continued and a few seconds later the captain reported having the approach lights in sight. The decision was made to continue the descent. The airplane suddenly contacted trees at an elevation of 996 feet msl. The aircraft crashed and caught fire.
Probable Cause:
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots failure to follow established procedures and properly conduct a non-precision instrument approach at night in IMC, including their descent below the MDA before required visual cues were available (which continued un-moderated until the airplane struck the trees) and their failure to adhere to the established division of duties between the flying and non-flying (monitoring) pilot.
Contributing to the accident were the pilots failure to make standard callouts and the current Federal Aviation Regulations that allow pilots to descend below the MDA into a region in which safe obstacle clearance is not assured based upon seeing only the airport approach lights. The pilots failure to establish and maintain a professional demeanor during the flight and their fatigue likely contributed to their degraded performance. "
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 3 months | Accident number: | NTSB AAR-06-01 | Download report: | Final report
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Classification:
Insufficient rest / fatigue
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) - Ground
Sources:
» NTSB
Follow-up / safety actions
NTSB issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 07-FEB-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-10 |
Modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to affect crew alertness. (A-06-10) (This recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation A-99-45.) (Open - Unacceptable Response) |
Issued: 07-FEB-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-11 |
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to incorporate fatigue-related information similar to that being developed by the Department of Transportation Operator Fatigue Management Program into their initial and recurrent pilot training programs; such training should address the detrimental effects of fatigue and include strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects. (Superseded by A-08-44) (Closed - Acceptable Action/Superseded) |
Issued: 07-FEB-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-7 |
Direct the principal operations inspectors of all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to reemphasize the importance of strict compliance with the sterile cockpit rule. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 07-FEB-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-8 |
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to incorporate the constant-angle-of-descent technique into their nonprecision approach procedures and to emphasize the preference for that technique where practicable. (Open - Acceptable Response) |
Issued: 07-FEB-2006 | To: FAA | A-06-9 |
Revise applicable 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 regulations to prohibit pilots from descending below the minimum descent altitude during nonprecision instrument approaches unless conditions allow for clear visual identification of all obstacles and terrain along the approach path or vertical guidance to the runway is available and being used. (Open Acceptable Alternate Response) |
Issued: 12-JUN-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-44 |
Develop guidance, based on empirical and scientific evidence, for operators to establish fatigue management systems, including information about the content and implementation of these systems. (A-08-44) (This safety recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation A-06-11) (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
Issued: 12-JUN-2008 | To: FAA | A-08-45 |
Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness of fatigue management systems implemented by operators, including their ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and prevent incidents and accidents. (Closed - Acceptable Action) |
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Photos
accident date:
19-10-2004type: BAe 3201 Jetstream 32EP
registration: N875JX
accident date:
19-10-2004type: BAe 3201 Jetstream 32EP
registration: N875JX
accident date:
19-10-2004type: BAe 3201 Jetstream 32EP
registration: N875JX
accident date:
19-10-2004type: BAe 3201 Jetstream 32EP
registration: N875JX
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Saint Louis-Lambert International Airport, MO to Kirksville Regional Airport, MO as the crow flies is 238 km (149 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.