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Last updated: 19 October 2021
Statuts:Enquête Officielle
Date:samedi 5 mai 2007
Type/Sous-type:Silhouette image of generic E110 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante
Compagnie:NHR Táxi-Aéreo
Immatriculation: PT-WAW
Numéro de série: 110122
Année de Fabrication: 1976
Equipage:victimes: 0 / à bord: 2
Passagers:victimes: 0 / à bord: 0
Total:victimes: 0 / à bord: 2
Dégats de l'appareil: Mineurs
Lieu de l'accident:Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport, RJ (GIG) (   Brésil)
Phase de vol: Au roulage (TXI)
Aéroport de départ:Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport, RJ (GIG/SBGL), Brésil
Aéroport de destination:?
The EMB-110 cargo plane was parked at Stand 13 at the Air Cargo Terminal (TPS-5). At 05:45 the flight was cleared to start the engine and taxi to runway 10 for departure via taxiway J.
The pilot started the taxi to taxiway J but the aircraft ran off the side of the platform, crossing a drainage ditch.

Probable Cause:

FACTORS (translated from Portuguese):
Medical aspect
a) Visual illusions - Contributed
The pilots misinterpreted the taxiway J due to false sensory impressions caused by taxi in nighttime with low light, improper painting of the taxiway, hiding of the lateral limit of the platform by bushes, mist, remaining water dew on the windshield and the existence of another taxiway extension in the path of the aircraft.

Operational aspect
a) Airport infrastructure - Contributed
The International Airport of Rio de Janeiro (Antonio Carlos Jobim) did not have the Operating Certificate RBHA 139 (Brazilian Aeronautical Certification Regulations), thus not having an Airport Operations Manual (AOM) approved by the regulator, with operational safety procedures for the aircraft platform that could provide constant monitoring of the movement area, to take immediate corrective action on discrepancies that pose unacceptable risks to aircraft.
The absence of an approved AOM, including operational safety procedures and maintenance of airport infrastructure in the movement area, contributed to the failure to identify existing latent risks on the TPS-5 platform, such as wear of guide lines, hue difference in taxi tread; growth of vegetation between the concrete blocks damaging the display of the platform edge indicator; and the existence of large quantities of failed spotlight lamps on the lampposts.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years
Accident number: A-029/CENIPA/2009
Download report: Final report


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Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
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