ASN logo
Last updated: 4 December 2021
Date:Friday 21 November 2014
Type:Silhouette image of generic E50P model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
Registration: N584JS
MSN: 50000140
First flight: 2010
Total airframe hrs:3854
Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW617F-E
Crew:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Passengers:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0
Total:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX (SGR) (   United States of America)
Phase: Landing (LDG)
Departure airport:Houston-William P. Hobby Airport, TX (HOU/KHOU), United States of America
Destination airport:Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX (SGR/KSGR), United States of America
An Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 corporate jet suffered a runway excursion accident after landing at Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX (SGR).
The airplane operated on a repositioning flight from Houston-William P. Hobby Airport, TX (HOU) to Sugar Land Airport.
Following an ILS approach, the Sugar Land tower controller cleared the flight to land on runway 35. The airplane reached 50 ft above touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) at an indicated airspeed of 118 knots (KIAS). The airplane crossed the runway displaced threshold about 112 KIAS, and it touched down on the runway at 104 KIAS with about a 7-knot tailwind.
About 1.6 seconds after touchdown of the main landing gear, the nose landing gear touched down and the pilot's brake pedal input increased, with intermediate oscillations, over a period of 7.5 seconds before reaching full pedal deflection. During this time, the airplane achieved its maximum wheel braking friction coefficient and deceleration. The cockpit voice recorder recorded both pilots express concern the that the airplane was not slowing. About 4 seconds after the airplane reached maximum deceleration, the pilot applied the emergency parking brake (EPB). Upon application of the EPB, the wheel speed dropped to zero and the airplane began to skid, which resulted in reverted-rubber hydroplaning, further decreasing the airplane's stopping performance.
The airplane continued past the end of the runway, crossed a service road, and came to rest in a drainage ditch. Postaccident examination of the brake system and data downloaded from the brake control unit indicated that it functioned as commanded during the landing. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or spoilers to aid in deceleration.
The operator's standard operating procedures required pilots to conduct a go-around if the airspeed at 50 ft above TDZE exceeded 111 kts. Further, the landing distances published in the airplane flight manual (AFM) are based on the airplane slowing to its reference speed (Vref) of 101 KIAS at 50 ft over the runway threshold. The airplane's speed at that time exceeded Vref, which resulted in an increased runway distance required to stop; however, landing distance calculations performed in accordance with the AFM showed that the airplane should still have been able to stop on the available runway. An airplane performance study also showed that the airplane had adequate distance available on which to stop had the pilot continued to apply maximum braking rather than engage the EPB. The application of the EPB resulted in skidding, which increased the stopping distance.
Although the runway was not contaminated with standing water at the time of the accident, the performance study revealed that the maximum wheel braking friction coefficient was significantly less than the values derived from the unfactored wet runway landing distances published in the AFM, and was more consistent with the AFM-provided landing distances for runways contaminated with standing water.
It is likely that, based on the landing data in the AFM, the crew expected a faster rate of deceleration upon application of maximum braking; when that rate of deceleration was not achieved, the pilot chose to engage the EPB, which only further degraded the airplane's braking performance.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The pilot's engagement of the emergency parking brake during the landing roll, which decreased the airplane's braking performance and prevented it from stopping on the available runway. Contributing to the pilot's decision to engage the emergency parking brake was the expectation of a faster rate of deceleration and considerably shorter wet runway landing distance provided by the airplane flight manual than that experienced by the crew upon touchdown and an actual wet runway friction level lower than the assumed runway fiction level used in the calculation of the stopping distances published in the airplane flight manual."

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: NTSB
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 3 years
Accident number: CEN15LA057
Download report: Final report

Runway excursion

» KPRC Houston

METAR Weather report:
16:03 UTC / 10:03 local time:
KSGR 211603Z 12009KT RA 2SM BR SCT008 BKN035 OVC044 19/18 A3015 RMK AO2 P0002 T01890178

16:12 UTC / 10:12 local time:
KSGR 211612Z 13008KT 6SM -RA BR FEW008 19/18 A3015 RMK BKN033 OVC042 AO2 P0003 T01890178
Wind 130 degrees at 8 knots; Visibility: 6 miles; light rain, mist; few clouds at 800 feet AGL; broken clouds at 3300 feet AGL; overcast cloud deck at 4200 feet AGL; Temperature: 19°C; Dewpoint: 18°C; Pressure 1021.1 mb

16:25 UTC / 10:25 local time:
KSGR 211625Z 13008KT 10SM FEW006 BKN018 A3015 RMK AO2 OVC044 19/18 RAE20 ACRFT MISHAP P0003 T01940178

16:53 UTC / 10:53 local time:
KSGR 211653Z 13009KT 10SM FEW007 FEW011 A3015 RMK AO2 OVC017 20/18 RAE20 SLP212 ACRFT MISHAP P0003 T02000183

Follow-up / safety actions

FAA issued 1

Show all...


photo of Embraer-EMB-500-Phenom-100-N584JS
accident date: 21-11-2014
type: Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
registration: N584JS

Video, social media

This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Houston-William P. Hobby Airport, TX to Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX as the crow flies is 36 km (23 miles).

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
languages: languages