Vliegtuigongeval op 05 MAY 2017 met Shorts 330-200 N334AC - Charleston-Yeager Airport, WV (CRW)
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Status:Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Datum:vrijdag 5 mei 2017
Type:Silhouette image of generic SH33 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Shorts 330-200
Luchtvaartmaatschappij:Air Cargo Carriers
Registratie: N334AC
Constructienummer: SH.3029
Bouwjaar: 1979-05-31 (38 years)
Aantal vlieguren:28023
Aantal vluchten:36738
Motoren: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-45R
Bemanning:slachtoffers: 2 / inzittenden: 2
Passagiers:slachtoffers: 0 / inzittenden: 0
Totaal:slachtoffers: 2 / inzittenden: 2
Schade: Vernield
Gevolgen: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Plaats:Charleston-Yeager Airport, WV (CRW) (   Verenigde Staten)
Fase: Landing (LDG)
Soort vlucht:Vracht
Vliegveld van vertrek:Louisville International Airport, KY (SDF/KSDF), Verenigde Staten
Vliegveld van aankomst:Charleston-Yeager Airport, WV (CRW/KCRW), Verenigde Staten
A Shorts 330 cargo plane was destroyed in an accident while landing at Charleston-Yeager Airport, West Virginia, USA. Both crew members suffered fatal injuries.
The aircraft originated from Louisville International Airport, Kentucky at 05:41 hours.
As the flight neared Yeager Airport at an altitude of 9000 ft, the crew received the most recent ATIS report for the airport indicating wind from 080° at 11 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 700 ft agl, and a broken ceiling at 1300 ft agl.
However, a special weather observation recorded about 7 minutes before the flight crew's initial contact with the approach controller indicated that the wind conditions had changed to 170° at 4 knots and that cloud ceilings had dropped to 500 ft agl. The approach controller did not provide the updated weather information to the flight crew and did not update the ATIS.
The approach controller advised the flight crew to expect the localizer 5 approach, which would have provided a straight-in final approach course aligned with runway 5. The first officer acknowledged the instruction but requested the VOR-A circling instrument approach, presumably because the approach procedure happened to line up with the flight crew's inbound flightpath and flying the localizer 5 approach would result in a slightly longer flight to the airport.
However, because the localizer 5 approach was available, the flight crew's decision to fly the VOR-A circling approach was contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP).
The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the localizer approach was 373 ft agl, and the MDA for the VOR-A approach was about 773 ft agl. With the special weather observation indicating cloud cover at 500 ft agl, it would be difficult for the pilots to see the airport while at the MDA for the VOR-A approach; yet, the flight crew did not have that information. The approach controller was required to provide the flight crew with the special weather report indicating that the ceiling at the arrival airport had dropped below the MDA, which could have prompted the pilots to use the localizer approach; however, the pilots would not have been required to because the minimum visibility for the VOR-A approach was within acceptable limits.

The approach controller approved the first officer's request then cleared the flight direct to the first waypoint of the VOR-A approach and to descend to 4000 ft. Radar data indicated that as the flight progressed along the VOR-A approach course, the airplane descended 120 feet below the prescribed minimum stepdown altitude of 1720 ft two miles prior to FOGAG waypoint. The airplane remained level at or about 1600 ft until about 0.5 mile from the displaced threshold of the landing runway. At this point, the airplane entered a 2500 ft-per-minute, turning descent toward the runway in a steep left bank up to 42° in an apparent attempt to line up with the runway.
Performance analysis indicates that, just before the airplane impacted the runway, the descent rate decreased to about 600 fpm and pitch began to move in a nose-up direction, suggesting that the captain was pulling up as the airplane neared the pavement; however, it was too late to save the approach.
At 06:50, the airplane impacted the runway 5 centerline in a 22° left bank and 5° nose-down at an airspeed of about 92 knots. The airplane's left wingtip struck the pavement first, followed by the left main landing gear and left propeller. The fuselage impacted the pavement and the left wing separated from the airplane during the impact sequence. The airplane slid off the left side of the runway through the grass safety area and down a hill through trees, coming to rest about 380 feet left of the runway centerline and 85 ft below the runway elevation.

Video and witness information were not conclusive as to whether the captain descended below the MDA before exiting the cloud cover; however, the descent from the MDA was not in accordance with federal regulations, which required, in part, that pilots not leave the MDA until the "aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal descent rate using normal maneuvers." The accident airplane's descent rate was not in accordance with company guidance, which stated that "a constant rate of descent of about 500 ft./min. should be maintained." Rather than continue the VOR-A approach with an excessive descent rate and airplane maneuvering, the captain should have conducted a missed approach and executed the localizer 5 approach procedure.
No evidence was found to indicate why the captain chose to continue the approach; however, the captain's recent performance history, including an unsatisfactory checkride due to poor instrument flying, indicated that his instrument flight skills were marginal. It is possible that the captain felt more confident in his ability to perform an unstable approach to the runway compared to conducting the circling approach to land.

Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The flight crew's improper decision to conduct a circling approach contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP) and the captain's excessive descent rate and maneuvering during the approach, which led to inadvertent, uncontrolled contact with the ground. Contributing to the accident was the operator's lack of a formal safety and oversight program to assess hazards and compliance with SOPs and to monitor pilots with previous performance issues."

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: NTSB
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 5 months
Accident number: DCA17FA109
Download report: Final report

» tristateupdate.com
» flightaware.com

METAR Weather report:
10:30 UTC / 06:30 local time:
KCRW 051030Z 17004KT 10SM FEW001 OVC005 14/13 A2940 RMK AO2 VLY FG T01390133 $

10:54 UTC / 06:54 local time:
KCRW 051054Z 23003KT 10SM FEW001 OVC005 14/13 A2941 RMK AO2 SLP952 VLY FG T01440133

10:59 UTC / 06:59 local time:
KCRW 051059Z COR 00000KT 10SM FEW001 OVC005 14/13 A2940 RMK AO2 VLY FG T01440133


photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: N334AC
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
Radar flight track
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
Radar flight track
photo of Shorts-330-200-N334AC
Approach profile view with features of the VOR-A approach
photo of Shorts-330-200-G-BGNA
accident date: 05-05-2017
type: Shorts 330-200
registration: G-BGNA

Video, social media

Aircraft history
date registration operator remarks
31 May 1979 G-BGNA Shorts first flight
27 Sep 1979 G-BGNA Loganair registered
29 April 1983 G-BGNA Manx Airlines registered
1 Nov. 1983 G-BGNA Air Ecosse registered
19 April 1984 G-BGNA Metropolitan Airways registered
24 Oct 1985 G-BGNA Shorts registered
21 Nov 1985 G-BTJR Shorts re-registered
24 Sep. 1986 SE-IVX Syd-Aero registered
1 July 1988 SE-IVX Avia
12 Sep. 1989 G-BTJR Shorts registered
19 Dec. 1989 VH-LSI Queensland Pacific Airlines bought
25 Oct. 1990 VH-LSI Sunstate Airlines
19 Feb. 1996 VH-LSI Airnorth Central
20 April 1998 N334AC Corporate Air
14 Dec. 1998 N334AC Air Cargo Carriers registered
16 April 2004 N334AC Air Cargo Carriers brake failure during taxi at Kansas City; struck other aircraft

Deze kaart geeft het vliegveld van vetrek weer en de geplande bestemming van de vlucht. De lijn tussen de vliegvelden geeft niet de exacte vliegroute weer.
De afstand tussen Louisville International Airport, KY en Charleston-Yeager Airport, WV bedraagt 360 km (225 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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