ASN Aircraft accident Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 9H-FAM Paris-Le Bourget Airport (LBG)
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Status:Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:Monday 8 February 2021
Time:11:02
Type:Silhouette image of generic E50P model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
Operator:Luxwing
Registration: 9H-FAM
MSN: 50000100
First flight: 2011
Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW615F
Crew:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Passengers:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1
Total:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:Paris-Le Bourget Airport (LBG) (   France)
Phase: Landing (LDG)
Nature:Int'l Non Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:Venice-Marco Polo Airport (VCE/LIPZ), Italy
Destination airport:Paris-Le Bourget Airport (LBG/LFPB), France
Flightnumber:LWG301
Narrative:
Shortly before landing on runway 27 at Paris-Le Bourget Airport, the Embraer Phenom 100 aircraft stalled. It came down hard and the main gears and the nose gear broke. The plane slid on the runway and a fire broke out. The plane came to a stop to the left of the runway.

Probable Cause:

Contributing factors:
The three accidents discussed in the BEA final report have some similarities and highlight the difficulty for a crew to make an appropriate decision about using de-ice systems in icing conditions.
This decision is influenced by the high operational constraints due to the landing performance limitations in icing conditions on this type of plane.
The extent of the landing performance penalties in icing conditions, compared to landing performance in non-icing conditions on this type of aircraft results in crews frequently encountering situations where the destination airport is accessible with comfortable safety margins in non -icing conditions but becomes inaccessible if the conditions are icing (i.e. total outside temperature below 5°C and visible moisture on approach, even in the absence of any signs of accretion on the aircraft). This may lead crews, both during flight planning and while carrying out the flight, to underestimate the risk of encountering icing conditions during the approach and landing in order to comply with the requested flight schedule or to avoid a diversion.
Although compliance with the Flight Manual procedures is mandatory, the commercial pressures associated with this type of operation may encourage crews not to comply with the proper procedures for the approach and landing in icing conditions by deactivating the de-ice systems as soon as they visually observe that the leading edges of the wings are free of ice, and they consider that the risk of further contamination before landing is low. The statements gathered during the investigation suggest that this inadequate practice is common in the Phenom 100 pilot community.
The following factors may have contributed to the crew not diverting and to them continuing the approach without the activation of the de-ice system:
- The operator's choice to use an aeroplane type for flights to destinations where icing conditions on approach are not unlikely, although the performance of this aeroplane type is degraded in icing conditions and becomes incompatible with the runway landing distances available, even though these runway landing distances provide substantial margins in the absence of icing conditions.
- The degraded landing performance of the Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 in icing conditions compared to performance in non-icing conditions. Crews thus frequently encounter situations where the destination airport is accessible with comfortable safety margins in non-icing conditions but becomes inaccessible in icing conditions.
- A deviation in the application of the de-ice/anti-icing system activation procedure, due to the landing performance penalties in icing conditions on this aircraft type, which does not appear to be limited to this crew or this operator. Instead of activating the wing and horizontal stabilizer de-ice system as soon as the temperature drops below 5°C in the presence of visible moisture, this system is only activated by the crews when they visually observe ice on the leading edges of the wing. It is then deactivated as soon as these crews note the absence of ice on the leading edges of the wings and consider that the risk of further ice accumulation before landing is low.

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency: BEA
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years
Accident number: BEA2021-0052
Download report: Final report

Classification:
Loss of control

Sources:
» BEA

METAR Weather report:
09:30 UTC / 10:30 local time:
LFPB 080930Z AUTO 36005KT 320V040 5000 BR OVC011 M01/M03 Q0998 BECMG BKN020

10:00 UTC / 11:00 local time:
LFPB 081000Z AUTO 01004KT 320V040 5000 BR OVC011 M01/M03 Q0998 BECMG BKN020

10:30 UTC / 11:30 local time:
LFPB 081030Z AUTO 34004KT 280V020 5000 BR OVC012 M01/M03 Q0998 BECMG BKN020


Photos

photo of Embraer-EMB-500-Phenom-100-9H-FAM
accident date: 08-02-2021
type: Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
registration: 9H-FAM
photo of Embraer-EMB-500-Phenom-100-9H-FAM
accident date: 08-02-2021
type: Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
registration: 9H-FAM
photo of Embraer-EMB-500-Phenom-100-9H-FAM
accident date: 08-02-2021
type: Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
registration: 9H-FAM
 

Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line is connecting ADS-B datapoints from Flightradar24.
Distance from Venice-Marco Polo Airport to Paris-Le Bourget Airport as the crow flies is 835 km (522 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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Embraer Phenom 100

  • 359+ built
  • 8th loss
» safety profile

 France
  • 9th worst accident
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