ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 137787
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Date: | Sunday 31 July 2011 |
Time: | 16:00 LT |
Type: | Bell 407 |
Owner/operator: | Vancouver Island Helicopters (VIH) |
Registration: | C-GNVI |
MSN: | 53847 |
Year of manufacture: | 2008 |
Engine model: | Allison 250-C47B |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 3 / Occupants: 3 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | Nelson Glacier, near Stewart, BC -
Canada
|
Phase: | En route |
Nature: | Survey |
Departure airport: | Stewart Airport |
Destination airport: | |
Investigating agency: | TSB |
Confidence Rating: | Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
Narrative:The helicopter was operating in support of mineral explorations near a rugged mountain face at an alt of about 6000 ft ASL when the aircraft's tracking unit reported the helicopter inactive.
Several hours later the helicopter was found broken apart and scattered about 900 ft down the rocky face of the mountain. The 406 ELT activated but no signal was received as the ELT antenna cable was broken during the crash.
The occurrence aircraft was equipped with a GPS tracking system, which provided position updates every 2 minutes. The system did not include any means of automatic emergency notification. In this occurrence, ground personnel did not receive a manually activated emergency notification via the GPS tracking system, which contributed to the belief that the occurrence pilot had landed to wait for the weather to improve. According to the company operations manual (COM), the overdue-aircraft response plan should have been initiated when the aircraft was considered to be overdue. However, the absence of a reported ELT signal, combined with having not received an emergency notification via the GPS tracking system, led ground personnel to believe that the situation did not warrant initiating the overdue-aircraft response plan. This belief contributed to the delay in initiation of search-and-rescue action. The operator's overdue-aircraft response plan required that the JRCC be notified that search-and-rescue services may be required. This step did not occur, and the JRCC was not notified of the overdue aircraft. If the JRCC is not notified in a timely manner, the flight crew and passengers of that aircraft are placed at increased risk for injury or death as a result of delays in potentially critical life-saving search-and-rescue services.
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
1.While working in close proximity to steep terrain, the helicopter's main-rotor blades made contact with terrain, causing a subsequent loss of control and collision with terrain.
Findings as to Risk
1.When there is a gap between operator procedures and actual practice, flight crew and passengers may be placed at increased risk of injury or death following an accident.
2.If the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre is not notified in a timely manner once an aircraft is determined to be overdue or has been involved in an accident, the flight crew and passengers of that aircraft are placed at increased risk for injury or death as a result of delays in potentially critical, life-saving search-and-rescue services.
3.Damage to the emergency locator transmitter or its antenna increases the likelihood that a distress signal will not be detected. As a result, injured flight crew and passengers will be at elevated risk for death due to delays in life-saving search-and-rescue services.
4.Procedures such as toe-in landings and hover exits require passengers to release their restraint systems. Passengers conducting hover exits are at increased risk for injury if restraint systems are unfastened for periods longer than necessary.
5.If cockpit or data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
Other Findings
1.The investigation did not establish a link between 4-week tour lengths and pilot fatigue in this occurrence.
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | TSB |
Report number: | A11P0117 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 11 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
Cadors Number: 2011P1201
http://web.archive.org/web/20130721105526/http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2011/08/01/bc-helicopter-crash.html
http://www.airport-data.com/images/aircraft/small/000/531/531231.jpg (photo)
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11p0117/a11p0117.asp
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
15 December 2010 |
C-GNVI |
Vih Helicopters Ltd. |
0 |
8NM South East of Blue River (CYCP) |
|
sub |
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
01-Aug-2011 11:09 |
Willy |
Added |
01-Aug-2011 12:57 |
TB |
Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Operator, Other fatalities, Location, Nature, Source, Damage, Narrative, Plane category, ] |
01-Aug-2011 23:47 |
RobertMB |
Updated [Aircraft type] |
04-Aug-2011 17:28 |
RobertMB |
Updated [Registration, Cn, Phase, Source, Narrative] |
05-Aug-2011 03:09 |
Anon. |
Updated [Source, Narrative] |
01-Sep-2014 10:18 |
Aerossurance |
Updated [Departure airport, Source, Narrative] |
15-Nov-2014 20:12 |
Aerossurance |
Updated [Narrative] |
30-Sep-2016 16:54 |
Aerossurance |
Updated [Time] |
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