ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 147116
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Narrative:During clear dark night visual meteorological conditions, the crew of an Airbus A-340-300 airplane was given a clearance to taxi to runway 32 via taxiway Romeo, and Kilo. The captain, the non-flying pilot, taxied the airplane. A relief captain occupied the center cockpit seat, and the first officer occupied the right seat. The airplane proceeded southbound on taxiway Romeo, a heading of 140 degrees, and was cleared for takeoff on runway 32 by a tower controller as the airplane was approaching taxiway Kilo. The airplane made a right turn from taxiway Romeo onto taxiway Kilo, a heading of 240 degrees, and came to a stop at the lighted hold line east of the runway 32 extension. The airplane was expected to have continued west on Kilo into the extended portion of runway 32, and then turned right (north) onto the approach end of runway 32, but the captain requested the "before takeoff checklist," and the first officer, the flying pilot, complied. Following his completion of the checklist, the captain stated, "You have control." The airplane accelerated west on taxiway Kilo. Tower controllers noticed the departure roll, and the airport's emergency phone to the fire department was activated. The local controller did not make a radio call to the crew to abort the takeoff as he felt it was too late. The airplane took off, proceeded to its destination and landed without further incident. After departure, main landing gear tire impressions were found in a snow berm at the west end of taxiway Kilo. The available taxiway distance from Romeo to the end of Kilo is about 6,800 feet. The calculated takeoff distance for the airplane was 7,746 feet. The cockpit navigation display for the Airbus A340 depicts the airplane's heading along a rotating arc near the top of the navigational display, along with a yellow airplane symbol and a white runway symbol. Taxiway Romeo and Kilo are equipped with green centerline lights having variable illumination intensity through three settings. The taxiway centerline lights for Romeo and Kilo were set on the standard (level 1) intensity level. The intersection of taxiway Kilo and Romeo has a yellow centerline stripe in the radius of the turn from Romeo to Kilo, but no centerline lights along the radius of the turn. The intersection of Kilo and the extended portion of runway 32 have a yellow centerline stripe in the radius of the turn from Kilo onto the extended centerline of runway 32, but no centerline lights along the radius of the turn. The centerline lights of Kilo did not extend through the extended portion of runway 32. Some reflective material of each taxiway centerline marking was indistinct, missing, or obscured by small patches of ice. The incident flight was the captain's first trip from Anchorage. It was the first time he flew with the first officer, and he had flown with the reserve captain on numerous occasions. The operator's aircraft operating manual for the Airbus fleet did not contain a checklist requirement for the crew to verbalize and verify the runway in use before takeoff.
|Fatalities:||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 252|
|Aircraft damage:|| None|
|Location:||Anchorage International Airport, AK (ANC) -
United States of America
|Phase:|| Take off|
|Nature:||Passenger - Scheduled|
|Departure airport:||Anchorage-Ted Stevens International Airport, AK (ANC/PANC)|
|Destination airport:||Taipei, (RCTP)|
|Investigating agency: ||NTSB|
|Confidence Rating:|| Accident investigation report completed and information captured|
Probable Cause: The captain's selection of a taxiway instead of a runway for takeoff and the flightcrew's inadequate coordination of the departure, which resulted in a departure from a taxiway. A factor in the incident was inadequate airline operator's procedures that did not require the crew to verbilize and verify the runway in use prior to takeoff.
||ASN Update Bot
||Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]|
||ASN Update Bot
||Updated [Operator, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative]|
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