ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 150239
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| Date: | Tuesday 16 October 2012 |
| Time: | 08:30 LT |
| Type: |  Lake LA-250 Renegade |
| Owner/operator: | Private |
| Registration: | C-GZLC |
| MSN: | 87 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 3 / Occupants: 4 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | South of Pickle Lake Airport - CYPL, ONT -
 Canada
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | CYQD |
| CYPL | |
| Investigating agency: | TSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
The privately registered Aerofab Inc. Lake 250 (registration C-GZLC, serial number 87) was being ferried from Lac la Biche, Alberta, to Trois Rivières, Quebec, with planned stops in The Pas, Manitoba, and Pickle Lake, Ontario. There were 2 pilots and 2 passengers on board. While conducting a visual approach to Runway 27 at Pickle Lake, the aircraft entered a steep descent and struck terrain approximately 1 nautical mile east of the runway threshold. The accident occurred during hours of darkness at approximately 1928 Eastern Standard Time. Both pilots and 1 passenger were fatally injured. The other passenger sustained minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. There was no post crash fire. The aircraft's emergency locator transmitter activated on impact. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Trenton, Ontario, dispatched a C 130 Hercules, which dropped rescue personnel to the site. The surviving passenger was transported to Winnipeg, Manitoba, treated for minor injuries and released.
The night arrival at Pickle Lake would have increased the difficulty involved in conducting an approach to an unfamiliar airport and made the pilot's workload heavier. The increased workload would have contributed to the pilot's decrease or loss of situational awareness.
There were no reported controllability issues on take-off or landing, therefore it is unlikely that the aircraft's weight or centre of gravity position was a contributing factor in this occurrence.
The information obtained from the wreckage, engine, and propeller examinations indicates that the engine and propeller were operating normally at the time of the accident. Consequently, aircraft component failure is not believed to have contributed to the cause of this accident.
As C-GZLC was approaching the airport, the 3 audible microphone clicks indicated that the runway and PAPI lights were set to low intensity. This would have made visual acquisition of the runway difficult. The dark conditions east of the airport and low intensity runway lighting likely contributed to a black hole illusion. This would have led to a loss of situational awareness with respect to the aircraft's relative position from the runway and the rate of descent, and made it more difficult to manoeuver the aircraft to a safe landing on Runway 27.
A light associated with the landing gear extension had illuminated in the cockpit, and was shaded on the PIC's command. The momentary flash of the light could have impaired the pilots' night vision to a certain degree. The PIC was flying in the right seat while carrying out a left-hand circuit. Looking across the cockpit past the pilot in the left seat would have made visual acquisition of the runway more difficult
The occurrence aircraft was flying at an altitude of 4500 feet asl, which was 2200 feet higher than the usual circuit altitude for a visual approach to CYPL. To make a visual approach to Runway 27 from a downwind position at 4500 feet, would require the pilot to make a very steep descent during a continuous turn to join final approach. This type of steep approach would have made visual acquisition of the runway lighting more difficult and would have exacerbated any visual perceptual difficulties the pilot may have been experiencing. The perceptual challenges posed by black hole illusion would be compounded if the pilot was not current with night landings.
It is not known what rate of turn was utilized to manoeuver the aircraft from downwind leg to final leg. The aircraft descended approximately 3200 feet from the downwind turn to the point of impact. This would require a descent rate of approximately 3000 fpm during the turn. This high rate of descent is consistent with what the crew of the second aircraft observed. A descent rate of 3000 fpm is approximately 6 times the normal rate of descent, and would not be considered a stable approach. Descending at such a high rate would minimize or negate any guidance that could be obtained from the PAPI system because the aircraft would descend through the various approach path indications at an extremely rapid rate.
The dark environment, lack of visual cues and low intensity runway lighting likely led to a loss of situational awareness. This probably contributed to the pilots not taking appropriate measures to correct the aircraft's high rate of descent prior to collision with terrain.
Pilots who hold a Canadian licence must be proficient in either English or French. Under Canadian regulations, these pilots are permitted to operate anywhere in Canada. In this occurrence, neither pilot's proficiency in English had been assessed. Communication difficulties between the pilots and the CYQT FSS personnel were encountered, and were in part attributable to language difficulties. If pilots are not proficient in the language used by air traffic services, there is a risk they may have difficulty communicating with air traffic services or receiving critical information from those.
- Probable Cause :
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
(1) The night arrival in Pickle Lake increased the pilot's workload and the difficulty of an approach to an unfamiliar airport.
(2) The dark environment to the east of the airport, the lack of visual cues and the low intensity runway lights likely contributed to a loss of situational awareness with respect to the aircraft's relative position from the runway and the rate of descent.
(3) The loss of situational awareness likely contributed to the pilot's not taking appropriate measures to correct the aircraft's high rate of descent prior to collision with terrain.
(1) If pilots are not proficient in the language used by air traffic services, there is a risk they will have difficulty communicating with air traffic services or receiving critical information from them.
- Other findings:
(1) The engine and propeller were operating normally during the occurrence.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2012/a12c0141/a12c0141.html (Final Report)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 17-Oct-2012 09:43 | aeropics | Added |
| 17-Oct-2012 09:45 | harro | Updated [Aircraft type, Source] |
| 17-Oct-2012 09:47 | harro | Updated [Aircraft type, Narrative] |
| 17-Oct-2012 13:54 | RobertMB | Updated [Time, Registration, Cn, Operator, Other fatalities, Location, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative] |
| 18-Oct-2012 01:30 | Alpine Flight | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Damage] |
| 08-Jan-2013 13:26 | harro | Updated [Embed code] |
| 27-Jul-2019 18:54 | Captain Adam | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
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