ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 177184
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| Date: | Sunday 21 June 2015 |
| Time: | c. 20:00 |
| Type: |  Cessna 172P Skyhawk |
| Owner/operator: | McMurray Aviation |
| Registration: | C-GJSE |
| MSN: | 17274696 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1981 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | NE of Ft McMurray International Airport (CYMM), Ft McMurray, AB -
 Canada
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Training |
| Departure airport: | Fort McMurray (CYMM) (Alberta) |
| Fort McMurray (CYMM) (Alberta) | |
| Investigating agency: | TSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
Two light aircraft collided in mid air near Fort McMurray, Alberta Canada. One aircraft crashed, killing both occupants. The other aircraft, a Cessna 185 float plane, lost the left hand float and suffered a partial detachment of the remaining right hand float. The aircraft landed at Fort McMurray Airport.
TSB report:
Analysis
The clouds, visibility, sun position, and aircraft serviceability were not contributory to the occurrence. Therefore, the analysis will discuss limitations of human vision, practice area awareness, communications, and collision avoidance systems.
Limitations of the see-and-avoid principle
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) report on the limitations of the see-and-avoid principle details the various limitations of human vision. The following discusses how these limitations likely contributed to this accident.
There were 3 opportunities during the occurrence flight when the instructor, who was sitting in the right seat, might have seen the approaching aircraft. The first was at 1916:44, when C-GJSE (GJSE) was travelling northeast on a reciprocal heading to C-FAXO (FAXO), offset 0.5 nautical miles (nm) to the right. At that time, FAXO was more than 1.8 nm away, below an overcast layer of cloud. Since GJSE was at a lower altitude, the instructor would have had to look up to see FAXO. FAXO, being predominantly white against a white and grey overcast sky, would have been difficult to see due to contour interaction. Also, at that approach angle, FAXO would have appeared as a relatively stationary and extremely small object in GJSE's windscreen. This would have made it difficult for the instructor to detect FAXO unless actively scanning for the traffic.
The second was at 1917:05, when GJSE turned left across the path of FAXO. Since the instructor likely had no idea that there was another aircraft in the general vicinity, it is likely that the instructor's attention was in the direction of the turn, not 90 degrees to the right.
The third was at 1917:34, while GJSE was heading southwest on a parallel track to FAXO, 0.37 nm to the right and 200 feet lower. FAXO was overtaking GJSE from behind by 60 knots. Given that GJSE is a high-wing aircraft, its left wing likely blocked the instructor's view of the approaching aircraft. This blockage of the instructor's vision would have likely continued during the left climbing turn in front of FAXO until the collision at 1917:53.
The ATSB report Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle identified that
The pilot's functional visual field contracts under conditions of stress or increased workload. The resulting ‘tunnel vision' reduces the chance that an approaching aircraft will be seen in peripheral vision.
Even though the 2 aircraft flew in close proximity to each other for a number of seconds, it was unlikely that the instructor would have picked up the traffic peripherally due to the increased workload while instructing.
The pilot of FAXO faced similar challenges. Until advised by the tower controller, he was not aware that there was a need to be looking for a specific aircraft. When FAXO was 1.8 nm away from, and higher than, GJSE on the reciprocal heading, GJSE would have appeared as an extremely small object in the windscreen. In addition, in the minutes leading up to the accident, the pilot of FAXO was entering a period of increased workload while approaching Fort McMurray, Alberta (CYMM) Airport. He had obtained the ATIS (automatic terminal information service) information, begun communicating with the CYMM tower controller, and set the transponder code. This may have rendered his peripheral vision ineffective.
In summary, neither pilot saw the other aircraft in time to avoid a mid-air collision, due to the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid principle.
Practice area awareness
Although the flight training practice area was not depicted on the visual flight rules (VFR) terminal procedures chart (VTPC) for CYMM in the Canada Flight Supplement (CFS), or on the visual navigation chart, both pilots were well aware of its location. The instructor in GJSE had spent in excess of 600 hours instructing in the previous 12 months using this area. The pilot of FAXO had trained at CYMM and flew in the area regularly. The choice to fly a GPS route direct to CYMM rather than via the VFR route depicted in the VTPC resulted in FAXO flying through the flight training practice area. If pilots do not follow preferred VFR routes in the CFS/VTPC, they may enter airspace where there is an increased risk of collision.
Communications and position reporting
Since the flight training practice area is located in Class G airspace, the appropriate frequency for VFR position reporting is 126.7 MHz.
The primary radio in GJSE was severely damaged, and the investigation was unable to determine what frequency it was tuned to at the time of the collision. The investigation determined that the secondary radio in GJSE was tuned to 123.5 MHz, which is the North Oil Sands frequency. It was McMurray Aviation's procedure to monitor 126.7 MHz in the practice area. Even though the No. 1 radio in GJSE was destroyed, it was likely tuned to 126.7 MHz.
Prior to contacting CYMM tower, the pilot of FAXO was monitoring 126.7 MHz. However, communications were not established between FAXO and GJSE. If pilots do not actively provide and listen out for traffic advisories, there is an increased risk of collision in uncontrolled airspace.
Airborne collision avoidance systems
Neither aircraft was equipped with any type of aircraft collision avoidance system (ACAS), nor was it required by regulation. As previously established, a number of viable and economical on-board alerting systems exist or are under development. If used, these technologies offer the potential to significantly reduce the risk of mid-air collisions. If VFR aircraft are not equipped with ACAS, it is highly likely that accidents will continue to occur due to the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid technique of collision avoidance.
Findings
Findings as to causes and contributing factors
1. Neither pilot saw the other aircraft in time to avoid a mid-air collision, due to the
inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid principle.
Findings as to risk
1. If pilots do not follow preferred visual flight rules (VFR) routes in the Canada Flight
Supplement / VFR terminal procedures chart, they may enter airspace where there is
an increased risk of collision.
2. If pilots do not actively provide and listen out for traffic advisories, there is an
increased risk of collision in uncontrolled airspace.
3. If visual flight rules aircraft are not equipped with aircraft collision avoidance
systems, it is highly likely that accidents will continue to occur due to the inherent
limitations of the see-and-avoid technique of collision avoidance.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
http://www.fortmcmurraytoday.com/2015/06/22/two-dead-after-planes-crash-near-fort-mcmurray
[LINK NOT WORKING ANYMORE:http://www.edmontonjournal.com/people+dead+after+small+planes+collide+northeast+Fort+McMurray/11156795/story.html]
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/small-planes-collide-mid-air-in-alberta-police-say-2-dead-1.2434131
https://www.facebook.com/mcmurrayaviation/photos/a.377978572230148.99786.117712211590120/1078862818808383/?type=1
http://www.airliners.net/photo/Cessna-172P-Skyhawk/1159249/M
TSB report : http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2015/a15w0087/a15w0087.pdf
Media:
One of our training aircraft was involved in a tragic accident. We cannot provide any further details at this time. pic.twitter.com/lkLnxhPE7e
— McMurray Aviation (@McAviation) June 22, 2015Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 22-Jun-2015 07:10 | MCTechFlies | Added |
| 22-Jun-2015 07:11 | harro | Updated [Aircraft type, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Location, Country, Embed code] |
| 22-Jun-2015 07:12 | harro | Updated [Location, Phase, Embed code, Narrative] |
| 22-Jun-2015 07:14 | harro | Updated [Time] |
| 22-Jun-2015 13:45 | Aerossurance | Updated [Aircraft type, Location, Source] |
| 22-Jun-2015 17:44 | harro | Updated [Narrative] |
| 22-Jun-2015 20:08 | Geno | Updated [Aircraft type, Operator, Location, Nature, Source] |
| 01-Jul-2015 23:47 | Geno | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Source] |
| 13-Jan-2017 13:46 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Embed code, Narrative] |
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