Wirestrike Accident Aeroprakt A-22L A6-XGG, 04 Oct 2016
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 193316
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Time:c. 17:40
Type:Silhouette image of generic AP22 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Aeroprakt A-22L
Owner/operator:Jazirah Aviation Club
Registration: A6-XGG
MSN: 220
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Location:Al Marjan Island, Ras Al Khaimah -   United Arab Emirates
Phase: Landing
Departure airport:Al Jazirah Al Hamra Aerodrome (OMRJ(
Destination airport:Al Jazirah Al Hamra Aerodrome (OMRJ(
Investigating agency: GCAA UAE
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
On 4 October 2016, at approximately 1720 United Arab Emirates (UAE) local time (LT), an Aeroprakt-22L fixed-wing light sport aircraft (LSA), registration mark A6-XGG, owned by Jazirah Aviation Club, conducted a pleasure flight in Ras Al Khaimah area. There were two persons on-board; the Pilot and a passenger.
Before 1700 LT, the Pilot decided to have a 10 to 15 minute pleasure flight with the passenger. At approximately 1700 LT, preparation for the flight, which involved cleaning the windshield, checking the engine oil, refuelling, and pre-flight checks were performed. The Pilot also reviewed the weather forecast (METAR) for OMRK which was printed and available in the Club Operations Office. OMRJ3 had no facility providing weather forecast.
At approximately 1720, the Aircraft took off from OMRJ runway 34. Since OMRJ is an uncontrolled airspace aerodrome, the Pilot broadcast his intention during the takeoff.
After approximately 10 minutes flying time, the Club contacted the pilot requesting him return to the aerodrome and land the Aircraft as soon as possible because the weather was changing. While the Aircraft was in the Al Hamra area on its return to OMRJ, the Club Operations requested the Aircraft position, and requested the pilot to expedite the landing. The pilot provided his position and stated that he would expedite the landing. Runway 28 was given for the landing by the Operations.
When the Aircraft was flying about 2.8 kilometers (km) (1.5 nautical miles) north of OMRJ, the Operations asked whether the pilot had the runway in sight, and he replied “negative”. The pilot stated that the weather front was moving towards the Aircraft, and that visibility was less than 1 km. The pilot decided to approach closer to the aerodrome in an attempt to identify a familiar landmark and to use this reference to see the runway and land.
As the Aircraft approached the aerodrome, the pilot was unable to identify a landmark or see the runway. The pilot stated that there were a considerable number of electric power lines surrounding OMRJ. Therefore, when the Aircraft was approximately at 400-500 feet above ground level (AGL), he decided not to descend further, and he called the Operations advising that he would divert and land the aircraft at Marjan Island, since he was aware that there were many open areas.
The reported wind obtained from the Operations was between 280 and 160 degrees.
When the aircraft was flying over Marjan Island, the pilot performed one orbit looking for the landing site. He identified a sandy area where car tire marks were visible, and he decided to land at that location. He estimated that the length of the selected location was sufficient for the landing.
After deciding on the landing site, the pilot flew the aircraft on a right downwind. The pilot maintained the downwind as he identified electrical pylons on the approach path of the final leg and he considered these to be obstacles. After flying a long downwind leg, the pilot performed a right turn to base leg and the flaps were set to the first position, and then he continued the right turn to the final leg.
In the approach on final, the aircraft flew over the electrical pylons and the glide path was then increased to bring the aircraft onto the touchdown point as planned by the pilot. During the approach, the aircraft experienced a headwind and a small crosswind component. The wind speed was between 15 and 20 knots, as estimated by the pilot.
On landing, the aircraft was on a heading of approximately 310 degrees, the airspeed was about 100 km per hour. The landing was uneventful. As the aircraft decelerated on the landing roll, the pilot realized that there was a ditch in front of the aircraft, and that the aircraft would not stop before reaching the ditch. Preparing for the impact with the ditch the pilot ensured that he and the passenger were properly restrained by the harness and that they had positioned themselves with their backs supported by the seatbacks. There were two ditches in front of the aircraft. The aircraft entered the first ditch which had a depth of about 80 centimeters, and it then continued into the second ditch which had a depth of approximately 130 centimeters. As the aircraft entered the second ditch, it turned over slowly and came to rest in an upsidedown position.

The Air Accident Investigation Sector determines that the cause of the Accident was the decision of the Pilot to conduct a flight in adverse weather conditions that was not in accordance with the published limitations of the Operations
Contributing Factors
The Air Accident Investigation Sector determines that contributing factor to the Accident was the inappropriate selection of the off-field landing site as the Pilot did not carry out the required overflight site exploration due to time
pressure as the weather conditions were rapidly changing and sunset was approaching.
Accordingly, the Pilot was unable to identify ditches located in the selected forced landing area, which added to the severity of the Accident in terms of Aircraft damage.


AAIS Case No AIFN/0012/2016

Safety recommendations:

Safety recommendation SR01/2017 issued 25 January 2017 by GCAA to Jazirah Aviation Club
Safety recommendation SR02/2017 issued 25 January 2017 by GCAA to Jazirah Aviation Club
Safety recommendation SR03/2017 issued 25 January 2017 by GCAA to Jazirah Aviation Club
Safety recommendation SR04/2017 issued 25 January 2017 by GCAA to GCAA


Photo(c): GCAA

Revision history:

05-Feb-2017 20:48 harro Added
05-Feb-2017 20:50 harro Updated [Time, Aircraft type]
08-Mar-2022 23:41 Captain Adam Updated [Photo]

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