ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 194950
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information.
If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information
Narrative:Jet Airways flight 9W234 returned to land at Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport, Netherlands after reports that the aircraft suffered a tail strike on departure.
|Fatalities:||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 358|
|Aircraft damage:|| None|
|Location:||Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport, Noord-Holland -
|Phase:|| Take off|
|Nature:||Passenger - Scheduled|
|Departure airport:||Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM)|
|Destination airport:||Toronto-Pearson International Airport, ON (YYZ/CYYZ)|
|Investigating agency: ||Dutch Safety Board|
|Confidence Rating:|| Accident investigation report completed and information captured|
The Boeing 777-35RER took off from runway 18C at 11:05 LT. About 11:10 the Departure controller radioed that the Tower controller thought that the observed a tailstrike on rotation, but that the runway controller did not notice anything.
About 11:12 the Radar controller cleared the flight to climb to FL240. However, about two minutes later the flight requested permission to stop the climb at FL150. Subsequently a request was made to turn back to Schiphol Airport and to descend. The Rdaar controller issued vectors and cleared the flight down to FL100.
A safe landing was carried out on runway 27 at 12:18 LT.
After landing, it appeared that a tail strike had occurred but that the wear of the tail skid shoe was within limits and no immediate repair was necessary.
The tailstrike was caused by an overrotation of the aeroplane during the takeoff, which was the result of a lower than required airspeed at which the rotation was started. The reason for this was that the actual takeoff weight was higher than the takeoff weight that had been used for the takeoff performance calculation. Due to a human error predominantly caused by time pressure, incorrect load sheet data was supplied to the pilots. Neither the airline’s loading procedures nor the cross check of data by the pilots did prevent the use of the incorrect data for the takeoff performance calculation. The interaction between human performance, the cross check of data by the pilots, the airline’s loading procedures, limited systems integration and operational pressure to meet the planned takeoff time contributed to the takeoff performance calculation with the incorrect data as input.
Furthermore, in this situation of insufficient thrust setting, as a result of the takeoff performance calculation with incorrect entry data, the takeoff was performed without the required safety margins. In case of an engine failure after the decision speed V1, the aeroplane would not have been able to continue the flight safely.
| || |
|Investigating agency: ||Dutch Safety Board |
|Status: ||Investigation completed|
|Download report: || Final report|
||Updated [Photo, ]|
||Updated [Total occupants, Narrative]|
||Updated [Embed code]|
||Updated [Embed code, Damage, Narrative]|
||Updated [Total occupants, Narrative, Accident report]|
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
CONNECT WITH US:
©2023 Flight Safety Foundation