ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 196692
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Narrative:The ultralight was towing a banner and crashed for unknow reasons.
ICP Savannah VG
|Owner/operator:||Corsica Sky Services|
|Fatalities:||Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1|
|Aircraft damage:|| Written off (damaged beyond repair)|
|Location:||Capo-di-Feno, Ajaccio, Corse du Sud 2A -
|Nature:||Banner and glider towing|
|Destination airport:||Capo di Feno airstrip|
|Investigating agency: ||BEA|
|Confidence Rating:|| Accident investigation report completed and information captured|
The pilot (61), manager of Corsica Sky Services, died few hours at the hospital.
Bea report conclusions:
3 - LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION
During his flight to Propriano, the pilot felt a break in the chain of orders in roll. It is likely that this corresponded to the break
one of the two attachments of the optional dual-control system. The upkeep of the system by the second fixation allowed normal operation in
pitch but introduced an important game in roll.
The positioning of this binding under the seats did not allow the pilot to seewhat part had yielded. Still succeeding in controlling the ULM, and not thinking probably not a second break can take place, the pilot made the choice to return to his base to drop his banner. The flight of ten minutes to join Capo di Feno probably helped him in his decision.
After the dropping, the pilot conducted an aerodrome circuit to return to land.The rupture of the second attachment took place during the last turn, making the ULM uncontrollable on roll and pitch axes. The withdrawal of the reserve parachute for reasons of maintenance did not allow the pilot to limit the consequences loss of control.
The accident is due to the fatigue failure of the two attachments of the optional system of double command. Following this accident, the manufacturer published a bulletin mandatory service requiring the replacement of inter-sleeve tubes by with different tie geometry, and by limiting the use of
service of this new room at 600 hours.
| || |
|Investigating agency: ||BEA |
|Status: ||Investigation completed|
|Download report: || Final report|
||Updated [Operator, Source, Embed code, Narrative]|
||Updated [Embed code]|
||Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Location, Nature, Embed code]|
||Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Registration, Phase, Destination airport, Source, Embed code, Narrative]|
||Updated [Aircraft type, Cn, Embed code]|
||Updated [Location, Embed code]|
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