Incident Piper PA-28-161 Warrior II G-BJSV,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 202900
 
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Date:Tuesday 22 August 2017
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic P28A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Piper PA-28-161 Warrior II
Owner/operator:
Registration: G-BJSV
MSN: 28-8016229
Year of manufacture:1980
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4
Aircraft damage: Unknown
Location:Lelystad Airport (EHLE) -   Netherlands
Phase: Standing
Nature:Private
Departure airport:Lelystad Airport (LEY/EHLE)
Destination airport:
Confidence Rating: Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities
Narrative:
G-BJSV, a Piper PA-28-161, was in front of the hangar of a flying club at Lelystad Airport. On board were four occupants: the pilot and three passengers, who were about to make a local flight. It was the first flight of the day for this aircraft. After the pilot had completed the checklist he primed three times to inject fuel into the engine cylinders. He then started the engine, and when it did not start, he pushed the throttle a little forward. The engine still failed to start, and the pilot stopped starting the engine. He waited for a minute. Then, after having primed four additional times and having opened the throttle a little further still, he tried starting the engine, again without success. He then adjusted the position of the fuel mixture handle so as to lean the fuel mixture, intending to burn off the fuel that had been injected into the cylinders. The engine still did not start. While starting the engine he noticed white smoke coming out of the engine compartment, and interpreted this as exhaust smoke.
The pilot waited for a while again, primed four times, and opened the throttle halfway. During starting he saw black smoke and then flames coming from the engine area. The pilot immediately stopped turning the engine, switched off the electrics, leaned the fuel mixture, closed the throttle and switched off the ignition. By this time the passengers had got out of the aircraft. The pilot was the last to leave the aircraft.
The engine fire was quickly extinguished by bystanders and witnesses. The airport fire service that arrived shortly thereafter was not required to intervene, as the fire had already been extinguished. The fire had raged through the engine compartment, causing considerable damage to the engine and its accessories.
The pilot’s logbook revealed that he had gained most of his flying experience in a different type of aircraft, the Cessna 172. Between 29 June 2017 and the day of the incident he had made four flights with a PA-28, and had gained some experience with a PA-28 two years previously. His total experience with the PA-28 amounted to about 15 hours.
G-BSJV is modified to run on another type of fuel, namely motor gasoline (mogas). This modification involves installing a second fuel pump in series with the regular fuel pump. The pumps are so mounted that they supply pressure to an earlier point in the fuel supply system, namely before the priming installation. In a standard PA-28 the fuel pump is mounted after the priming installation. Mogas is a less volatile fuel and has a different anti knock value than 100LL/AVGAS, which means that the engine starting procedure is more critical than that of a standard PA-28 running on 100LL/AVGAS fuel.
Because of the different properties of mogas and standard AVGAS fuel, mogas engines are subject to a different starting procedure: in principle the primer is not used if the fuel pumps are engaged. Only if the engine fails to start with the fuel pumps engaged should priming be (sparingly) used. This different starting procedure for aircraft running on mogas is not included in the Piper Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) but made public by means of a service bulletin. The flying club has therefore modified its standard checklist accordingly, and the matter is also discussed during training flights.
Chapter 3 of the POH describes emergency procedures. In section 3.7, ‘Engine fire during start’, it states (in brief) that an engine fire during start is usually the result of overpriming. If a fire is observed, it recommends continuing to start until the engine is running, in order to draw excess fuel back into the engine. Even if a fire is seen before the engine has started, it is recommended to move the mixture control to ‘idle cut-off’ and to continue turning the engine over. In the event that a fire does not go out within a few seconds, it should be extinguished by the best available external means.
From the description it appears that the primer was used to inject fuel directly into the cylinders a total of eleven times. Use was also made of the throttle, allowing additional fuel mixture into the cylinders. Priming repeatedly with the fuel pumps engaged is in contradiction to the instructions given in the checklist of the flying club for this aircraft. This checklist differs from the standard checklist for the PA-28. The flying club’s checklist states that there should be none of very limited priming. This multiple priming resulted in excess fuel being delivered into, and probably also outside, the engine. Starting the engine then ignited the fuel. In contrast to what the checklist prescribes, when the pilot discovered the fire he did not continue to start the engine but shut off all fuel and electricity before abandoning the aircraft together with his passengers. Prompt and effective action by witnesses who were able to put the fire out with their own fire extinguishers prevented the fire from spreading and requiring the involvement of the airport fire services. It is likely that the pilot’s limited experience on this type of aircraft played a role in the development of the fire.

Sources:

https://onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1686/e781b5b9946620172661-luchtvaartrapportage-q4-2017-171130-en.pdf

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
13-Dec-2017 13:28 harro Added
13-Jun-2022 02:34 Ron Averes Updated [Location]

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