ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 206255
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| Date: | Sunday 28 January 2018 |
| Time: | 15:00 LT |
| Type: |  Airbus Helicopters H130 |
| Owner/operator: | Air Evac Ems Inc |
| Registration: | N894GT |
| MSN: | 8185 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2015 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 88 hours |
| Engine model: | Turbomeca Arriel 2D |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Memphis Regional Medical Center, TN -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Standing |
| Nature: | Ambulance |
| Departure airport: | Humboldt, TN |
| Memphis Regional Medical Center, TN | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The pilot of the helicopter air ambulance performed an approach and landing to a rooftop heliport in gusting wind conditions, during which he reduced collective pitch control friction to more readily apply collective control inputs. After landing, he started the after-landing portion of the checklist and turned the throttle twist grip on the collective from FLIGHT to IDLE, believing that he had engaged the collective lock. Shortly thereafter, the collective "popped up," and the helicopter became airborne. He immediately grabbed the cyclic with his right hand, the collective with his left hand, and twisted the twist grip to FLIGHT. The helicopter then landed hard, resulting in minor damage. Review of onboard video revealed a sequence of events consistent with the pilot's statement, and recorded data indicated that the collective rose up consistent with it not locked in the down position and resulted in the engine transitioning from IDLE to FLIGHT. This confirmed the pilot's observation that the collective rose uncommanded.
The helicopter was designed to be convertible from a dual-pilot configuration (for activities such as training), to single-pilot configuration (for activities such as air ambulance). Two days before the incident, the helicopter had been converted to the single-pilot configuration by a mechanic. This conversion required that the collective be balanced to avoid uncommanded movement; however, post-incident examination of the helicopter revealed that the collective would rise unassisted, indicating that the collective was improperly balanced after the helicopter was converted to the single-pilot configuration.
Probable Cause: The pilot's failure to lock the collective pitch control after landing, and the mechanic's failure to properly balance the collective pitch control after converting the helicopter to a single-pilot configuration, which resulted in an uncommanded collective movement and subsequent hard landing.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
NTSB ERA18IA078
FAA register: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=N894GT
Location
Media:
An EC130T2 had its dual controls removed but the collective balance was misrigged. It became inadvertently airborne rotors running on an elevated helipad in Memphis. https://t.co/mlOJYcv7K8 #airambulance #helicopter #flightsafety #aviationsafety #aviationmaintenance #humanfactors pic.twitter.com/IshdD9Hvsz
— Aerossurance (@Aerossurance) February 26, 2022
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 16-Feb-2018 14:27 | Aerossurance | Added |
| 08-Feb-2022 08:20 | Aerossurance | Updated [Operator, Total occupants, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative] |
| 26-Feb-2022 12:50 | Aerossurance | Updated [Source, Embed code] |
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