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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 207720
 
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Date:16-MAR-2018
Time:10:38
Type:Silhouette image of generic SR20 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Cirrus SR20
Owner/operator:Aerosim Academy Inc
Registration: N486DA
MSN: 1831
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial
Category:Accident
Location:Palatka Municipal Airport-Lt Kay Larkin Field (28J), Palatka, FL -   United States of America
Phase: Landing
Nature:Training
Departure airport:Orlando Sanford International Airport, FL (SFB/KSFB)
Destination airport:Palatka, FL (28J)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
A Cirrus SR22 (N816CD) flown by a private pilot and a Cirrus SR20 (N486DA) flown by a pilot undergoing instruction and a flight instructor were performing touch-and-go landings at the airport. The pilot of the SR22 and the flight instructor of the SR20 reportedly announced their positions on the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) as they flew around the airport traffic pattern. The SR22 pilot and the SR20 flight instructor both reported that they heard another pilot announce they were on a 6-mile final for the runway. The SR22 pilot turned onto the base leg and then onto final. The SR20 flight instructor stated that, because an airplane they had in sight was on short final approach, he chose to have the pilot undergoing instruction extend the downwind leg. When they were abeam the airplane that was on final, they turned onto base leg and then onto final. When the SR20 pilot undergoing instruction was just about to flare, the flight instructor heard “an explosion.” When the SR22 was over the runway about ready to begin to flare, the pilot heard a "bang" and the nose came up; the two airplanes had collided. None of the pilots in either airplane reported seeing the other airplane before the collision. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage.

The pilot of the SR22 indicated that he could not understand some calls from the SR20, and the flight instructor of the SR20 indicated that he did not hear some radio calls from the SR22. Postaccident examinations of the radios and audio panels installed in the SR22 revealed no evidence of preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. At least one of the radios was tuned to the airport CTAF, and the audio select panel was configured to use that radio to transmit and receive audio. Functional testing revealed that both of the SR22’s radios and the audio panel performed with no anomalies noted. Postaccident testing of the radios and audio select panel in the SR20 revealed no evidence of preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation, although damage sustained during the accident prevented a successful functional test of the comm 1 radio antenna’s functionality. Both of the radios in the SR20 were found set to the airport CTAF, but the microphone/transmit selector on the audio panel was set to comm 3. The investigation could not determine when the microphone/transmit selector was set to the comm 3 position. Had the selector been inadvertently set in this position by the S20 flight crew during their flight, it would have resulted in their traffic pattern position reports not being broadcast over the CTAF. Review of certified audio recordings from the departure airports for both airplanes and another airport for the SR22 revealed that the beginning of one transmission from the SR22 pilot was not clearly enunciated and that several portions of transmissions from both SR20 pilots were difficult to discern and/or were poorly enunciated. Because there was no audio recording of transmissions at the accident airport, it could not be determined whether the clarity or lack of transmissions from either flight crew contributed to the accident.

Probable Cause: Both pilots’ and the flight instructor’s failure to identify, see, and avoid the other airplane, which resulted in a midair collision.

Sources:

NTSB
FAA register: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=816CD

FAA register: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=N486DA

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NTSB
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 2 months
Download report: Final report
Other occurrences involving this aircraft

3 Dec 2011 N486DA Aerosim Training Solution 0 I-295 South, near the ramp to I-95 North, Jacksonville, FL non

Location

Media:


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
17-Mar-2018 00:46 Geno Added
17-Mar-2018 00:56 Geno Updated [Total occupants, Nature, Source, Narrative]
17-Mar-2018 12:04 Iceman 29 Updated [Time, Source, Embed code]
17-Mar-2018 12:40 Iceman 29 Updated [Embed code]
01-Jun-2019 07:27 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Embed code, Narrative, Accident report, ]
01-Jun-2019 18:44 harro Updated [Departure airport, Source, Embed code, Narrative]

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