ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 214010
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| Date: | Sunday 5 October 2014 |
| Time: | 16:30 LT |
| Type: |  Schroeder Fire Balloons G50/24 |
| Owner/operator: | Quercy Pluriel Montgolfière |
| Registration: | F-HCCG |
| MSN: | 1056 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 11 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Cazes-Mondenard, Tarn-et-Garonne -
 France
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | |
| Investigating agency: | BEA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Towards the end of the cruise, the balloon entered in a convective atmosphere generating variations of wind. The pilot decided to land. According to his instructions, the passengers adopted the safety position. During the descent, the vertical speed became important, despite pilot heating actions. Near the ground, the trajectory of the balloon turned left several tens of degrees. The pilot acted on the rotation vane to orient the large side of the rectangular pod perpendicular to the path, then actuated the rapid deflation system. The balloon hit the ground hard and then regained height. At the second impact, the basket turned completely. A fire occured during the evacuation of the occupants.
BEA final report:
Near the end of cruise, the balloon was flying in a convective atmosphere generating wind variations. The pilot made the decision to land. In accordance with his instructions, the passengers adopted the safety position. During the descent, the vertical speed became high despite burner inputs by the pilot. Near the ground, the balloon’s flight path turned to the left by several dozen degrees. The pilot activated the turning vents to position the long side of the rectangular basket perpendicular to the flight path and then activated the rapid deflation system. The pilot lights were on. The balloon struck the ground hard, then regained height. On the second impact, the basket turned over completely. A fire broke out during the evacuation of the occupants.
The investigation showed that the accident was due to the combination of the following factors:
inadequate consideration given to the meteorological conditions, which exposed the balloon to turbulence and variations in the force and direction of the wind, probably of a convective nature, which in the end caused the basket to turn over;
the failure to turn off the pilot lights before the first impact. This could be due to the pilot focusing his attention on controlling the balloon’s rate of descent and orientation, during a hard and fast landing, generating stress.
The following factors may have contributed, though it was not possible to determine the degree to which they contributed:
the practice, the extent of which could not be precisely assessed, of landing with one or more pilot lights lit, which makes it unlikely that the pilot will instinctively react and turn them off in a fast or hard landing situation;
the use of a "double-T" installation - unauthorized by the manufacturer - that may limit the available heating power;
an overestimation of the safety offered by the pilot carrying out the actions specified in the Flight Manuals for an emergency landing, which must by nature be carried out under stress;
techniques and means of oversight of operators by the authority which are mainly concerned with regulatory compliance, poorly adapted to detecting risky practices.
The BEA issued recommendations to:
study the development of emergency "fuel shut-off" devices on board balloons;
homogenize the operational documents regarding the practice of turning off the pilot lights;
clarify the safety objectives for commercial balloon flights;
reinforce feedback from operators.
3 - CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings
ˆ The pilot had the licences required to undertake the flight. The airworthiness review
certificate had been renewed on 16 April 2014. It was valid up to 16 April 2015;
ˆ the "double-T" installation of the fuel pipes that was in place on the day of the accident
did not comply with the manufacturer's recommendations;
ˆ the pilot had completed a weight sheet which did not refer to the loading chart in the
Flight Manual. The estimated weight of the balloon on take-off was greater than the
weight obtained by using the loading chart in the conditions of the day;
ˆ the pilot had consulted the weather forecasts;
ˆ meteorological convection was active in the area of the accident, leading to turbulence;
ˆ the take-off and cruise took place without any notable events;
ˆ the wind was irregular at the end of the cruise and during the approach, exposing the
balloon, on several occasions, to a relative wind;
ˆ at the request of the pilot, the passengers adopted the safety position;
ˆ during the approach, the balloon's descent rate was high despite the heating inputs
by the pilot;
ˆ near the ground, the flight path turned to the left by several dozen degrees as a result
of a change in wind direction;
ˆ the pilot used the turning vents to try to turn the basket onto its long side then activated
the rapid deflation system;
ˆ the pilot lights were on during the landing;
ˆ the pilot was not attached by harness;
ˆ the first impact was hard. The basket climbed a little then struck the ground again and
turned over completely;
ˆ a fire broke out during the evacuation of the occupants and was then fuelled by the
basket wicker and the gas escaping from the bottles via the safety valves;
ˆ assisted by some passengers, the pilot tipped the basket onto its side, closed the gas
tanks and tried to extinguish the fire with the balloon extinguisher, then with the
extinguisher brought by the retrieve vehicle;
ˆ the turning off of the pilot lights is required by various documents relating to flying
hot air balloons. In practice sometimes they are not turned off by pilots before landing;
ˆ the oversight of the operator by the authorities did not bring to light the errors
contained in its Operations Manual;
ˆ the specific nature of this activity (place and time of take-off being dependent on the
weather, for example) makes it difficult to organise random checks.
3.2 Causes of the accident
The accident was due to a combination of the following factors:
ˆ inadequate appreciation of the meteorological conditions, which exposed the balloon
to turbulence and variations in the wind force and direction, probably of a convective
nature, which in the end caused the basket to turn over;
ˆ the failure to turn off the pilot lights before the first impact. This could be due to the
pilot focusing his attention on controlling the balloon’s rate of descent and orientation,
during a hard and fast landing, generating stress.
The following factors may have contributed, though it was not possible to determine the
degree to which they contributed:
ˆ the practice, the extent of which could not be precisely assessed, of landing with one
or more pilot lights lit, which makes it unlikely that the pilot will instinctively react and
turn them off in a fast or hard landing situation;
ˆ the use of an unauthorised "double-T" installation that may limit the available heating
power;
ˆ an overestimation of the safety provided by the pilot carrying out the actions specified
in the Fight Manuals for an emergency landing, which must by nature be performed
under stress;
ˆ techniques and means of oversight of operators by the authority which are mainly
concerned with regulatory compliance, poorly adapted to detecting risky practices.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/article/accident-du-schroeder-fire-balloons-g5024-immatricule-f-hccg-survenu-le-05102014-a-cazes-mondenar/
BEA report in english:
https://www.bea.aero/index.php?id=40&L=1&news=14203&cHash=ae55c368a53560eb027233dac76ba199
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/f-cg141005.en.pdf
Bea report in french:
https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/f-cg141005_01.pdf
https://www.bea.aero/fr/les-enquetes/les-evenements-notifies/detail/event/accident-to-the-schroeder-fire-balloons-g5024registered-f-hccg-on-05102014-at-cazes-mondenard-and/
Media:
📄🇬🇧Publication of the english version of the report on the accident to the #Schroeder Fire Balloons G50/24 registered F-HCCG on 05/10/2014 at #CazesMondenard and operated by Quercy Pluriel. https://t.co/sbWyTbzMAx pic.twitter.com/GUIDc3ei2Z
— BEA | Bureau d'Enquêtes & d'Analyses ✈️ 🚁🛩 🇫🇷 (@BEA_Aero) 27 septembre 2018
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 03-Aug-2018 19:28 | harro | Added |
| 27-Sep-2018 11:02 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Time, Total occupants, Location, Nature, Source, Embed code, Narrative, Plane category] |
| 27-Sep-2018 11:05 | Iceman 29 | Updated [Source, Embed code, Narrative] |
| 14-Nov-2018 10:26 | Anon. | Updated [Total fatalities] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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