ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 222544
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| Date: | Wednesday 12 December 2018 |
| Time: | 11:22 LT |
| Type: |  Beechcraft 1900C |
| Owner/operator: | Pacific Coastal Airlines |
| Registration: | C-GIPC |
| MSN: | UC-110 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1990 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 21 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Trail Airport, BC (CAD4) -
 Canada
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Vancouver International Airport, BC (YVR/CYVR) |
| Trail Airport, BC (CAD4) | |
| Investigating agency: | TSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities |
On 12 December 2018, at approximately 06:30, an airport vehicle operator (Operator 1) arrived at Trail Airport (CAD4), BC, to find that the runway was covered in slushy snow that had frozen overnight. A second airport vehicle operator (Operator 2) was called in to assist with snow removal; he arrived at the airport at 07:00. Shortly afterward, both vehicle operators began snow removal. Operator 1 was driving a truck and Operator 2 was driving a snowplow.
A Pacific Coastal Airlines Beechcraft 1900C aircraft, operating as flight PCO451, was conducting an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Vancouver International Airport (CYVR), BC, to CAD4. The flight was scheduled to depart CYVR at 09:15 with 2 flight crew members and 19 passengers on board. However, the departure was delayed because the runway conditions at CAD4 were reported as poor.
Runway conditions at CAD4 had been filed electronically in an Aircraft Movement Surface Condition Report (AMSCR) from a laptop on board one of the airport vehicles to the NAV CANADA web-based application SNOWiz. The truck driver filed an AMSCR at 06:55 and an updated AMSCR at 10:09.
After the flight crew received the updated AMSCR information, the flight departed CYVR at 10:21. Its estimated time of arrival at CAD4 was 11:23.
When the aircraft was at 12500 feet, on descent into CAD4, the weather became suitable for visual flight rules (VFR) flight. At 11:14, when the aircraft was approximately 21 nautical miles (NM) from CAD4, the flight crew cancelled IFR and continued heading east under VFR, over the city of Trail, which is northeast of CAD4.
At 11:17, the snowplow driver stopped at the runway holding position marking for runway 16/34. He used the mandatory frequency (MF) to contact the flight crew, requesting the aircraft’s arrival time. The flight crew responded that its estimated time of arrival was in 5 minutes. The snowplow driver informed the flight crew that he would be on the runway to remove an area of slush near the intersection with the taxiway. The flight crew acknowledged this communication, and the snowplow driver entered the runway moments later.
Approximately 30 seconds after the snowplow entered the runway, the truck driver entered the runway via the taxiway without confirming the aircraft’s location or stopping at the runway holding position marking. The truck driver reported making a call on the MF indicating that he was entering the runway; however, the did not hear the radio call. The truck driver then proceeded north on runway 16.
The snowplow driver observed the truck driving north on the runway and made a call on the MF to inform the truck driver that the aircraft was expected to land in approximately 3 minutes. The truck driver did not respond to this call, and the flight crew did not hear the attempted communication. The snowplow driver turned his focus back to snow-removal activities and, after turning in the opposite direction, lost track of the truck.
At 11:18, the snowplow driver exited the runway and reported on the MF that he was clear of the runway. The flight crew received and acknowledged this communication.
After the truck driver reached the threshold of runway 16, he turned and continued south on the runway toward the threshold of runway 34 The truck driver needed extra time at the threshold of Runway 34 to inspect ridges on the runway surface and to provide an updated AMSCR, but he did not broadcast his intentions.
While the aircraft was on its final approach, 4 NM from the airport, the flight crew reportedly called on the MF to indicate that they would be landing in 1 minute. Neither driver heard the radio call. Just before the aircraft landed, the flight crew conducted a visual scan of the runway and observed the snowplow on the apron.
After completing the inspection at the threshold of runway 34, the truck driver turned his vehicle northbound at 11:21 and drove along the east side of the runway.
The aircraft touched down on runway 16 at a speed of 113 knots. Immediately after touching down, the flight crew applied initial reverse to begin slowing the aircraft. As the crew looked down the runway, they observed the truck on the runway and applied full reverse and maximum braking. The aircraft began to skid as a result of the heavy braking; however, the crew was able to maintain control.
Upon seeing the landing aircraft, the truck driver accelerated in an effort to reach the taxiway and exit the runway. He was able to do so before the aircraft reached the intersection with the taxiway.
After passing the taxiway intersection, the aircraft rolled to a stop and turned around on the runway to take the taxiway to the apron, without further incident.
During this occurrence, the aircraft and the truck had come within 228 m of each other. The aircraft passed the taxiway intersection approximately 4 seconds after the truck entered the taxiway.
After Operator 1 had parked his truck beside the apron, he discovered that the volume on the vehicle’s very high frequency (VHF) 2-way radio had been turned down to an inaudible level.
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
- Although a radio functionality check was required before entering the manoeuvring area, per the Airport Vehicle Operator Permit (AVOP) Study Guide, the truck driver (Operator 1) did not conduct one. As a result, Operator 1 did not realize that the radio volume had been turned down to a level that prevented effective communication.
- The truck driver (Operator 1) did not broadcast the vehicle position or his intentions when changing location on the runway, contrary to what is required by Transport Canada’s Aerodrome Standards and Recommended Practices (TP 312). Broadcasting the vehicle’s position and the operator’s intentions would have greatly increased the chances of the flight crew becoming aware of his presence.
- The sun, low on the horizon, reflected off the wet runway, creating a solar glare condition that diminished the flight crew’s ability to detect the airport vehicle on the runway.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
TSB A18P0177
Images:
Aircraft and vehicle positions when the aircraft was applying full reverse (1) and as it approached the intersection with the taxiway (2) (Source: Microsoft Bing Maps, with TSB annotations)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 03-Mar-2019 20:35 | harro | Added |
| 06-Mar-2020 09:19 | harro | Updated [Narrative, Photo, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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