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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 226131
Last updated: 7 December 2021
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Type:Silhouette image of generic E170 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Embraer ERJ-175STD (ERJ-170-200)
Registration: G-FBJK
MSN: 17000359
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 78
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:Dublin Airport -   Ireland
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Dublin Airport (DUB/EIDW)
Destination airport:Cardiff-Wales Airport (CWL/EGFF)
Investigating agency: AAIB
The aircraft was scheduled to fly from Dublin Airport, Ireland to Cardiff Airport. This was to be the pilots’ second of four sectors for the day. The co-pilot was the Pilot Flying.
During the turnaround, having noted that runway 28 was in use, the pilots set up the aircraft’s Flight Management System (FMS) and Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) for runway 28. As the load sheet was not yet available, the co-pilot calculated the takeoff performance data on the EFB using an estimated takeoff weight; this was then cross‑checked by the commander. The data, which specified flap 1 for takeoff, was then entered into the FMS.
When the pilots obtained the departure clearance, ATC specified runway 10 for departure. The co-pilot recalculated the performance data for runway 10 using Intersection Echo 7 (E7), as this was the most limiting normal takeoff distance on this runway. However, she inadvertently selected E7 TMP [Temporary] on the EFB, which specified flap 4 for takeoff. The EFB was then passed to the commander for cross-checking, during which the
dispatcher arrived with the load sheet and load instruction report. The commander noticed a discrepancy with the loading information and discussed it with the dispatcher. Having resolved this, the commander returned to checking the EFB and noticed no anomalies. The data was then entered into the FMS.
While the crew had noticed the takeoff speeds had changed from the runway 28 calculation, neither noticed that Intersection E7 TMP had been used to perform the calculation, or that it specified flap 4. Also, the commander did not crosscheck the EFB‑generated speeds and flap setting against the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), as specified in the operator’s standard operating procedures (SOP). Additionally, the co-pilot did not mention she had used Intersection E7 as the basis of the calculations in her departure brief.
The aircraft commenced the takeoff on Runway 10, using the full length, with takeoff speeds for flap 4 but with flap 1 selected. As the aircraft rotated the co-pilot realised something was wrong when the takeoff speeds annunciated on the Electronic Flight Instrument System’s (EFIS) airspeed tape changed colour to amber, the Low Speed Awareness Line (LSAL) appeared and the aircraft felt “sluggish”. She therefore flew below the pitch attitude commanded by the flight director, in order to maintain a higher speed than commanded until the aircraft reached about 1,000 ft aal, where the flaps were retracted and the climb continued.
In the initial part of the climb, after the co-pilot had reviewed the performance page, she realised what had happened and brought it to the commander’s attention. The aircraft landed at Cardiff without further event and the crew notified the operator of the incident.


Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: AAIB
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 10 months
Download report: Final report


Photo of G-FBJK courtesy

Berlin - Tegel (EDDT / TXL) (closed)
25 May 2018; (c) Pertti Sipilä

Revision history:


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