Incident Airbus A310-304 C-GFAT,
ASN logo
ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 227130
 
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Date:Wednesday 16 May 2018
Time:19:01
Type:Silhouette image of generic A310 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Airbus A310-304
Owner/operator:Air Transat
Registration: C-GFAT
MSN: 545
Year of manufacture:1991
Engine model:GE CF6-80C2A2
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 215
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Incident
Location:near Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport -   Canada
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Toronto-Pearson International Airport, ON (YYZ/CYYZ)
Destination airport:Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, QC (YUL/CYUL)
Investigating agency: TSB
Confidence Rating: Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities
Narrative:
An Air Transat Airbus A310-304 aircraft, operating as flight TS485, was conducting an instrument flight rules flight from Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario, to Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Quebec. At about the same time, a privately owned Cessna 421-B aircraft (registration C-GADG, serial number 421B0802) conducting an instrument flight rules flight, was returning to Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport from Trois-Rivières Airport, Quebec. The Airbus was inbound from the west, and its flight path would take it north of the airport to commence an approach to land on Runway 24R. The Cessna was inbound from the northeast to commence an approach to land on Runway 24L.
At 19:01:17 Eastern Daylight Time, when the aircraft were approximately 18 nautical miles northeast of Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, a loss of separation occurred. Neither the required vertical separation minimum of 1000 feet nor the lateral separation minimum of 3 nautical miles was maintained. When the loss of separation occurred, they were 200 feet and 2.8 nautical miles from each other. At the closest point, the 2 aircraft came within 500 feet vertically and 1.7 nautical miles laterally of each other. At 19:02:22, following instructions from the controllers, the required separation was re-established, and the 2 aircraft landed without incident.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors
1. Combining the sectors in the Montréal terminal specialty because of short staffing, compounded by the sudden illness of the low arrivals controller and the closing and reopening of the low arrivals sector, increased the controllers' areas of responsibility as well as the workload and the level of complexity of the workload.
2. The transfer of control responsibility of the Cessna from the Rawdon sector controller directly to the north arrivals controller was a deviation from the procedures in the Montreal Terminal Operations Manual.
3. A structured and consistent operational environment was not maintained, and the north arrivals controller became responsible for an aircraft outside of his area of responsibility.
4. Control responsibility for the Cessna was not transferred from the north arrivals controller to the low arrivals controller-in-training before the Cessna entered the low arrivals sector airspace. Consequently, neither the north arrivals controller nor the low arrivals controller on-the-job instructor observed the Cessna entering the low arrivals sector airspace on the Canadian Automated Air Traffic System Situation Display until it was pointed out by the low arrivals controller-in-training.
5. Once the north arrivals controller provided information about the Cessna to the low arrivals controller during the transfer of position responsibility briefing, the north arrivals controller believed the low arrivals controller was now responsible for the aircraft, although control responsibility had not been transferred to the low arrivals controller.
6. Following the transfer of position responsibility of the low arrivals sector, the north arrivals controller concentrated on his usual area of responsibility, which did not include the airspace to the northeast of the airport where the Cessna was flying, and forgot to transfer the Cessna.
7. During the verbal briefing and exchange of aircraft information between the low arrivals controller on-the-job instructor and the low arrivals controller-in-training, information about the Cessna was not provided. Therefore, the low arrivals controller-in-training did not have an opportunity to incorporate knowledge of the converging instrument flight rules traffic into his awareness of the traffic situation.
8. The low arrivals controller on-the-job instructor was distracted from his on-the-job instructor responsibilities, from the Canadian Automated Air Traffic System Situation Display, and from the operation; as a result, he did not adequately monitor the developing situation or the operation.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: TSB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year 1 month
Download report: Final report

Sources:

TSB

History of this aircraft

Other occurrences involving this aircraft
27 September 2018 C-GFAT Air Transat 0 over North Atlantic Ocean non
Turbulence

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
14-Jul-2019 12:27 harro Added

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2024 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org