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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 233173
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Type:Silhouette image of generic A319 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Airbus A319-111
Owner/operator:Air France
Registration: F-GRHT
MSN: 1449
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants:
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:near Paris-CDG Airport -   France
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Marseille Provence Airport (LFML)
Destination airport:Paris Charles-De-Gaulle (LFPG)
Investigating agency: BEA
Confidence Rating:
At the end of the leg preceding the incident, in the absence of verification by the first officer, the captain's error in the fuel log calculation was not corrected/identified. It is likely that a result showing a difference of nearly 900 kg would have alerted this crew and the next to a Fuel Quantity Indicating Computer (FQIC) failure.The crew of the incident flight, trusting the information available to them (the ATL and the FQIC indications), had incorrect awareness at the start of the flight of the actual quantity of fuel on board.During the flight, the crew associated the activation of the low fuel level warning with an untimely warning related to the FQIC malfunction recorded by the previous crew in the ATL.Shortly afterwards, when the fuel pumps stopped due to fuel starvation, and then when the left engine shut down after the left tanks emptied, the crew were unable to identify the cause and thought that the two pumps had failed simultaneously. Throughout the flight, the crew retained the impression that the fuel quantity indicated in the ATL was correct and that the FQIC sensors could be malfunctioning. At no time did the crew question whether there was fuel in the left tank until they arrived at the apron.Technical examinations identified a failure of the fuel quantity indicating system, which provided erroneous information about the amount of fuel in the tanks before departure and during the flight.During the investigation, the coordination and exchanges between Airbus, Air France and the BEA enabled adequate safety measures to be put in place to prevent the failures identified.


Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: BEA
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 5 years and 11 months
Download report: Final report


Photo of F-GRHT courtesy

Helsinki - Vantaa (EFHK / HEL)
25 April 2022; (c) Juhani Sipilš

Revision history:

23-Feb-2020 10:45 harro Added

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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