ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 234901
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| Date: | Thursday 29 August 2019 |
| Time: | 09:00 UTC |
| Type: |  Airbus A319-111 |
| Owner/operator: | easyJet |
| Registration: | G-EZBI |
| MSN: | 3003 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2007 |
| Engine model: | CFM 56-5B5/P |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 163 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Nice Côte d’Azur Airport -
 France
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Nice-Côte d'Azur Airport (NCE/LFMN) |
| Newcastle Airport (NCL/EGNT) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
During their initial pre-flight preparation, the flight crew of easyJet flight U26482 chose to calculate takeoff performance based on the most limiting intersection available, Bravo 3, on runway 04R at Nice Côte d’Azur Airport, France. The aircraft departed from intersection Alpha 3 where the runway length available was 316 m greater than from Bravo 3. At lift-off the commander noted that the departure end of the runway was closer than he would have expected but did not perceive any other performance issues. Subsequent analysis of recorded flight data and the flight crew’s takeoff calculations indicated that both pilots had inadvertently used performance figures for a departure from intersection Quebec 3. With both pilots making the same mis-selection, the takeoff performance cross-check was invalidated and the error went undetected. The available runway length from Quebec 3 was 701 m greater than from Bravo 3.
The flight crew considered that the software user-interface and data presentation was a factor in the intersection selection error being made and subsequently missed. The investigation found that the operator was planning an update to the performance software that would place greater emphasis on a graphical rather than textual representation of runway characteristics.
AAIB Conclusion:
This incident resulted from identical independent errors not being trapped by a TORA cross-check or by EFB output validation. While revised software with a graphical runway presentation could have helped reduce the likelihood of this occurrence. Automated systems, such as TOS2, could, in the future, provide an effective barrier to incidents of this nature.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
AAIB
Images:
Figure: AAIB
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 09-Apr-2020 13:27 | harro | Added |
| 09-Oct-2022 18:42 | harro | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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